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I. INTRODUCTION
In McDonald v. City of Chicago1, a narrow 5-4 plurality held that
the “Second Amendment right recognized in District of Columbia v.
Heller” 2 is incorporated to the States as applied to United States
citizens. 3 The plurality was extremely divided with Chief Justice
Roberts, Justice Scalia, and Justice Kennedy joining only portions of
Justice Alito’s opinion. Meanwhile, Justices Thomas and Scalia each
wrote their own concurrence. In the end, what stands out is that the five
Justices comprising the McDonald plurality were the same five Justices
that decided the majority opinion in Heller. 4 Unlike the unified Heller
majority, the McDonald plurality was divided as to how the Second
Amendment should be incorporated through the Fourteenth Amendment.
While Chief Justice Roberts and Justices Scalia, Kennedy, and Alito
incorporated Heller right through the Fourteenth Amendment’s Due
Process Clause, 5 Justice Thomas incorporated it through the Privileges
or Immunities Clause. 6
This division is significant in many respects. Perhaps what is most
important is that the voting paradox effectively limited incorporation to
the right recognized in Heller—the right of armed, individual selfdefense of the home with a handgun—to citizens, 7 for Justice Thomas’s
concurrence states:

1. 130 S. Ct. 3020 (2010).
2. 128 S. Ct. 2783 (2008).
3. McDonald, 130 S. Ct. at 3026.
4. 128 S. Ct. 2783 (the majority consisted of Chief Justice Roberts and Associate Justices
Scalia, Kennedy, Thomas, and Alito).
5. McDonald, 130 S. Ct. at 3041-48.
6. Id. at 3058-88 (Thomas, J., concurring).
7. See Marks v. United States, 430 U.S. 188, 193 (1977) (“But we think the basic premise
for this line of reasoning is faulty. When a fragmented Court decides a case and no single rationale
explaining the result enjoys the assent of five Justices, ‘the holding of the Court may be viewed as
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I conclude that the right to keep and bear arms applies to the States
through the Privileges or Immunities Clause, which recognizes the
rights of United States “citizens.” The plurality concludes that the
right applies to the States through the Due Process Clause, which
covers all “person[s].” Because this case does not involve a claim
brought by a noncitizen, I express no view on the difference, if any,
between my conclusion and the plurality’s with respect to the extent to
which the States may regulate firearm possession by noncitizens. 8

Whether aliens, lawfully present, undocumented or both, have a
constitutional right to arms is just one of the many legal issues left
unanswered by the McDonald opinion. 9 Another unsettled issue
involves any clarification as to a standard of review for Heller’s
longstanding regulatory prohibitions. 10 The opinions of Justices Alito
and Thomas merely recite Heller’s constitutional presumption as to
traditional regulatory “prohibitions on the possession of firearms by
felons and the mentally ill,” and “laws forbidding the carrying of
firearms in sensitive places such as schools and government buildings,
or laws imposing conditions and qualifications on the commercial sales
of arms.” 11 Any hope that a more expansive Second Amendment would
be identified was dashed when every plurality opinion merely
incorporated the limited right recognized in Heller—nothing more. 12
Not even Heller’s brief mention of the importance of bearing arms to

that position taken by those Members who concurred in the judgments on the narrowest grounds’ . .
. ." (quoting Gregg v. Georgia, 428 U.S. 153, 169 n.15 (1976)).
8. McDonald, 130 S. Ct. at 3083 n.19.
9. Prior to McDonald, courts have consistently held that the right recognized in Heller does
not extend to undocumented aliens because they do not qualify as “persons,” see United States v.
Yanez-Vasquez, No. 09-40056-01-SAC, 2010 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 8166, at *5-13 (D. Kan. Jan. 28,
2010); United States v. Boffil-Rivera, No. 08-20437-CR, 2008 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 84633, at *11-22
(S.D. Fl. Aug. 12, 2008); United States v. Guerrero-Leco, No. 3:08cr118, 2008 U.S. Dist. LEXIS
103448, at *3 (W.D.N.C. Oct. 3, 2008) (noting Heller “did not find that all individuals present in
America are protected by the Second Amendment . . . [and] described that protection as belonging
to American citizens.”).
10. Heller, 128 S. Ct. at 2816-17 (“Like most rights, the right secured by the Second
Amendment is not unlimited. From Blackstone through the 19th-century cases, commentators and
courts routinely explained that the right was not a right to keep and carry any weapon whatsoever in
any manner whatsoever and for whatever purpose . . . Although we do not undertake an exhaustive
historical analysis today of the full scope of the Second Amendment nothing in our opinion should
be taken to cast doubt on longstanding prohibitions on the possession of firearms by felons and the
mentally ill, or laws forbidding the carrying of firearms in sensitive places such as schools and
government buildings, or laws imposing conditions and qualifications on the commercial sale of
arms.”).
11. McDonald, 130 S. Ct. at 3047 (quoting Heller, 128 S. Ct. at 2816-17).
12. Id. at 3020.
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hunt 13 was restated as dicta 14 and the prefatory language “well-regulated
militia” did not appear once in the five Justice plurality.
In sum, the McDonald decision did little to change the legal
landscape of “gun rights” as we know them other than preventing state
and municipal governments from having outright bans on handgun
possession in the home. This begets the question, “What, if any, other
Second Amendment protections will be extended, and what is the
constitutional standard of review by which future courts may extend
them?” Surprisingly, the answer to this question rests with the courts
using “historical guideposts.” While the plurality shunned historical
academia in examining the constitutional scope of the right to “keep and
bear arms,” 15 it ironically affirmed that much of this same history will
aid courts in carving out future Second Amendment protections.16
The Court’s deviation from historical academia is not a novel
concept. Throughout our jurisprudence, justices have wrestled with

13. Heller, 128 S. Ct. at 2801 (“The prefatory clause does not suggest that preserving the
militia was the only reason Americans valued the ancient right; most undoubtedly thought it even
more important for self-defense and hunting.”).
14. Neither Alito, Scalia, or Thomas’ opinions identified a right to hunt as applied to the
States. See McDonald, 130 S. Ct. at 3021-88. In fact, Alito’s plurality seems to intentionally
exclude hunting, writing, “[W]e stressed that the right was also valued because the possession of
firearms was thought to be essential for self-defense.” Id. at 3048.
15. Id. at 3048 (“[W]hile there is certainly room for disagreement about Heller’s analysis of
the history of the right to keep and bear arms, nothing written since Heller persuades us to reopen
and question there decided.”). The historical scholarship questioning Heller’s originalism is
immense. See Paul Finkelman, It Really Was About a Well-Regulated Militia, 59 SYRACUSE L.
REV. 267 (2008); William Merkel, The District of Columbia v. Heller and Antonin Scalia’s
Perverse Sense of Originalism, 13 LEWIS & CLARK L. REV. 349 (2009); Nathan Kozuskanich,
Originalism in a Digital Age: An Inquiry into the Right to Bear Arms, 29 J. EARLY REPUBLIC 585
(2009); PATRICK J. CHARLES, THE SECOND AMENDMENT: THE INTENT AND ITS INTERPRETATION BY
THE STATES AND THE SUPREME COURT (2009) [hereinafter THE SECOND AMENDMENT]; Patrick J.
Charles, The Constitutional Significance of a “Well-Regulated Militia” Asserted and Proven With
Commentary on the Future of Second Amendment Jurisprudence, 3 NORTHEASTERN L. REV. 1
[hereinafter The Constitutional Significance of A “Well-Regulated Militia”]; Patrick J. Charles, The
Right of Self-Preservation and Resistance: A True Legal and Historical Understanding of the
Anglo-American Right to Arms, 2010 CARDOZO L. REV. DE NOVO. 18, 22-24 (2010) [hereinafter The
Right of Self-Preservation and Resistance]; Patrick J. Charles, “Arms for Their Defence”?: An
Historical, Legal, and Textual Analysis of the English Right to Have Arms and Whether the Second
Amendment Should Be Incorporated in McDonald v. City of Chicago, 57 CLEV. ST. L. REV. 351
(2009) [hereinafter “Arms for Their Defence”?]; Saul Cornell, Heller, New Originalism, and Law
Office History: “Meet the New Boss, Same as the Old Boss,” 56 UCLA L. REV. 1095 (2009); Saul
Cornell, St. George Tucker’s Lecture Notes, the Second Amendment and Originalist Methodology,
103 NW. U. L. REV. 1541 (2009); David Thomas Konig, Why the Second Amendment Has a
Preamble: Original Public Meaning and the Political Culture of Written Constitutions in
Revolutionary America, 56 UCLA L. REV. 1295 (2009).
16. The plurality opinion begins with a thorough recitation of Second Amendment history in
order to frame the direction of the following arguments. McDonald, 130 S. Ct. at 3036-44.
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history; coming to conclusions that do not comport with the historical
consensus. 17 Perhaps the primary reason for the differences of
interpretation rests with the conflicting duties of a historian compared to
that of an advocate or jurist. 18 Historians sort through thousands of
pieces of historical evidence to recreate an event according to “beliefs,
attitudes, philosophies, prejudices and loyalties that are not those of our
day,” removing themselves from modern biases, which often leaves us
with more questions than answers. 19 Advocates use historical evidence
differently. They compile data and facts as a means to place their client
in the best position to succeed in the cause or litigation.20 Also, this
evidence is narrowly focused and but a sampling of the whole. While
advocates may properly quote sources and provide historical facts, they
ignore or recast others and fail to remove their modern biases. Most
importantly, advocates often lack the historical expertise to provide
context—a crucial aspect of the historical profession in determining the
truth and credibility of the work. 21 However, given that the goal of an
advocate is to succeed in the litigation, they are almost compelled to cast
history in a light that supports their stance, not what accepted historical
methodologies command. 22 It is a rare occurrence that advocates and
jurists are applauded by professional historians. 23
In many ways it is as if history and advocacy cannot co-exist. This
is because the law requires providing definitive answers to questions that
historians cannot confirm with accuracy, and advocates almost have a
duty to make conclusions that are not supported by social, philosophical,
and political norms of the historical era at issue. At the same time,
history and advocacy must co-exist. This is due to the fact that the use

17. See, e.g. Thomas Y. Davies, The Fictional Character of Law-and-Order Originalism: A
Case Study of the Distortions and Evasions of Framing-Era Arrest Doctrine in Atwater v. Lago
Vista, 37 WAKE FOREST L. REV. 239, 418-21 (2002). Judicial conclusions may deviate from
historical consensus for a variety of reasons, not limited to page limitations and the selective nature
of choosing history that supports the desired result.
18. Buckner F. Melton, Jr., Clio at the Bar: A Guide to Historical Method for Legists and
Jurists, 83 MINN. L. REV. 377, 382-88 (1998).
19. Id. at 378.
20. Id. at 382 (“One can hardly expect detached, unbiased history to appear within the context
of such an argument, for though advocates may pay lip service to the truth, their main objective is
victory.”). See also id. at 451 (“The honest historian, then, must recognize her biases and try to
subdue them, even as she realizes that to some degree she will probably fail. The effort, however, is
one of the things that makes the history credible.”).
21. Id. at 389-96.
22. Id. at 382.
23. Robert H. Jackson, Full Faith and Credit: The Lawyer’s Clause of the Constitution, 45
COLUM. L. REV. 1, 6 (1945).
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of legal precedent is history in itself. 24 Furthermore, it is almost a
necessity that advocates and jurists use some form of historical
methodology to determine the legislative intent of statutes, laws, and
ordinances. Lastly, and most importantly, history and advocacy must
co-exist, for when answering new constitutional questions it is
imperative that some aspect of “original intent” be examined through
historical sources. 25
Although history and advocacy must co-exist, this does not mean
that history and legal opinions addressing historical events will be or
have to be mirror images of one another.26 The differing methodologies
of law and history often command that the two disciplines operate in
parallel universes. While each universe may have similarities as to the
“who, what, when, and where,” it is the “why” that divides history from
the law. The Heller opinion offers the perfect example of how the
historical and legal professions diverge in this regard. Indeed, there are
scholarly works that support the Heller majority’s conclusion and
provide the adequate “who, what, when, and where.” 27 However, these
24. Melton, supra note 18, at 416.
25. For some approaches to fulfilling “original intent,” see JACK N. RAKOVE, INTERPRETING
THE CONSTITUTION: THE DEBATE OVER ORIGINAL INTENT (1990); Daniel A. Farber, The
Originalism Debate: A Guide for the Perplexed, 49 OHIO ST. L.J. 1085 (1989); KEITH E.
WHITTINGTON, CONSTITUTIONAL INTERPRETATION: TEXTUAL MEANING, ORIGINAL INTENT, AND
JUDICIAL REVIEW (1999); Jefferson Powell, The Original Understanding of Original Intent, 98
HARV. L. REV. 885 (1985); Paul Finkelman, Teaching Slavery in American Constitutional Law, 34
AKRON L. REV. 261 (2000) (discussing “original intent” in the constraints of the history of slavery);
Michael Kent Curtis, Teaching Free Speech From an Incomplete Fossil Record, 34 AKRON L. REV.
231, 257-58 (2000) (discussing the problems of “original intent” when courts do not take history in
context).
26. Melton, supra note 18, at 383-88.
27. For the two most prominent, see STEPHEN P. HALBROOK, THE FOUNDERS’ SECOND
AMENDMENT (2008); JOYCE LEE MALCOLM, TO KEEP AND BEAR ARMS: THE ORIGINS OF AN
ANGLO-AMERICAN RIGHT (1994). One great example, of many, concerning this divergence rests
with the 1775 THE DECLARATION OF THE CAUSES AND NECESSITY FOR TAKING UP ARMS. One of
the grievances states:
The inhabitants of Boston being confined within that town by the General, their
Governor, and having, in order to procure their dismission, entered into a treaty with
him, it was stipulated that the said inhabitants, having deposited their arms with their
own magistrates, should have liberty to depart, taking with them their other effects.
They accordingly delivered up their arms, but in open violation of honor, in defiance of
the obligation of treaties, which even savage nations esteemed sacred, the Governor
ordered the arms deposited as aforesaid, that they might be preserved for their owners, to
be seized by a body of soldiers; detained the greatest part of the inhabitants in the town,
and compelled the few who were permitted to retire to leave their most valuable effects
behind.
THE DECLARATION OF THE CAUSES AND NECESSITY FOR TAKING UP ARMS (July 6, 1775), reprinted
in SOURCE OF OUR LIBERTIES 295, 298 (Richard L. Perry ed., rev. ed. 1972) (Congress 1775).
Individual Right Scholars stress that this grievance proves that the colonists were disarmed in
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works lack the adequate “why” by jumping to predetermined
conclusions, maintaining modern ideological biases, and taking
historical events out of context; analyses that are not accepted by
historical academia because they conflict with the conducting of
historical methodologies.28
The fact that historical academia and the Supreme Court have
diverged on the Second Amendment does not mean the courts should
discard history altogether when examining the “right to keep and bear
arms” in future cases and controversies. It needs to be a point of
emphasis that—out of the three branches of government—only the
judiciary has a duty to preserve our past 29 through precedents, legislative
intent, and the Constitution with what is referred to as “original intent.”
To put it another way, jurists have a duty to maintain a “historical
consciousness.” 30 In the words of Oliver Wendell Holmes, this means:
In order to know what [the law] is, we must know what it has been,
and what it tends to become. We must alternately consult history and
existing theories of legislation. But the most difficult labor will be to
understand the combination of the two into new products at every
stage. 31

This maintaining of a “historical consciousness” requires jurists to
be forthright and honest in their opinions with their use of “historical
guideposts.” It is the rare occasion that historical events will specifically
correlate with a case or controversy before the court. The best that
jurists can hope for is to use “historical guideposts” to explain legal
outcomes based on some form of an accepted historical methodology. 32

violation of their right to “have arms.” What is apparent upon looking at the grievance is that there
is no mention of a right or privilege to “have arms.” This is odd seeing that the Declaration
describes the deprivation of trial by jury grievance as denying an “accustomed and inestimable
privilege”—a grievance that was described in the 1774 Declaration of Rights and Grievances as a
“constitutional” right. See Charles, “Arms For Their Defence,”? supra note 15, at 444. More
importantly, the grievance against Gage was not with the seizure of arms, but that he violated the
“treaty” with Boston’s inhabitants—a fact that is evidenced by the Declaration’s language “in
defiance of the obligation of treaties” and the contemporaneous literature of the period. Id. at 44348.
28. See supra note 15.
29. Erin Rahne Kidwell, The Paths of the Law: Historical Consciousness, Creative
Democracy, and Judicial Review, 62 ALB. L. REV. 91, 109-10, 146 (1998).
30. Id. at 146; Melton, supra note 18, at 384 (“If judges are going to write history, they should
strive to do a competent job of it.”).
31. OLIVER WENDELL HOLMES, THE COMMON LAW 5 (Mark DeWolfe Howe ed., Harvard
Univ. Press 1963) (1881).
32. Melton, supra note 18, at 385 (“[D]isparity in the state of research tools and sources . . . is
a principal reason why accomplished attorneys, judges, and law professors often turn out to be poor
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Perhaps the most effective historical methodology for jurists to use
is the combination of Social History and New Intellectual History.
Naturally, before combining the two, each methodology must be defined
according to its own terms. First, Social History focuses on “social
groups rather than on individuals, on the masses rather than the elites,
and on ordinary folk rather than prominent people.” 33 It examines what
the Supreme Court has dubbed “public understanding” or “popular
understanding”; a showing of social acceptance of an issue, case, or
controversy dependent on the era in question. Meanwhile, New
Intellectual History stresses political philosophy, “taking the ideas of the
founding fathers seriously and [accepting] their rhetoric as reflecting
more their view of reality.” 34 In the constraints of judicial review, New
Intellectual History takes into account political and philosophical
restraints on the issue, case, or controversy dependent on the area in
question. Thus, if we combine Social History and New Intellectual
History, it requires the courts to give consideration to both the ideologies
of the founding fathers and how the public understood those ideologies
in practice.
This leaves us with the question: “What is a ‘historical guidepost’
within the constraints of this Social History and New Intellectual History
methodological approach?” A “historical guidepost” is a historical
event, philosophy, or political ideology that was prominent or influential
in impacting the law, statute, or constitutional provision at issue. For the
purposes of analyzing the Second Amendment, a “historical guidepost”
is either a longstanding historical restriction on the “keeping” or
“bearing” of arms circa 1791 or a longstanding philosophical or political
ideology for regulating or restricting the “keeping” or “bearing” of arms
as understood circa 1791.
This article sets forth how the courts should address such
“historical guideposts” by prescribing a standard of review. First, the
purpose of a “historical guidepost” standard of review is to work within
the conflicting pursuits of the history and legal professions. As
discussed above, it is almost impossible for historians, advocates, and
jurists to come to the same historical conclusions.35 The purpose of a
historian is to seek the truth by balancing the historical evidence and

amateur historians. Another reason is the law’s emphasis on an analytical approach to the subject is
in many ways not just different from, but the antithesis of, a historical approach.”).
33. 1 INTERPRETATIONS OF AMERICAN HISTORY 19 (Gerald N. Grob & George A. Billias eds.,
6th ed. 1992).
34. Id. at 168.
35. Melton, supra note 18, at 382.
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attempting to disprove the historian’s thesis, which ultimately leads to
many questions being unanswered. Meanwhile, advocates and jurists
seek to provide definitive answers despite the lack of empirical
evidence. 36
Second, the “historical guidepost” standard of review works within
the constraints of judicial precedent. Although judicial precedent may
not comport with the historical consensus, advocates and jurists are
almost required to work within the history provided from the higher
court. 37 It is only at the Supreme Court that controversial history can be
reexamined to comport with the historical consensus. 38
Third, and most importantly, the “historical guidepost” standard of
review requires jurists to maintain a “historical consciousness.” This
requires jurists to accept our “[changing] societies, cultures, and
communities” 39 when examining “historical guideposts.” It will be a
rare occasion that a modern Second Amendment issue, case, or
controversy will exactly replicate eighteenth century facts or restrictions
on the “right to keep and bear arms” circa 1791. However, this should
not disparage that there existed longstanding political and philosophical
restrictions on arms circa 1791. It is these political and philosophical
restrictions that provide historic insight as to the constitutionality of
current “arms” regulations. What the “historical guidepost” approach
does is it takes into account these philosophies through the combination
of Social History and New Intellectual History methodologies.40
To be clear, the “historical guidepost” approach seeks to work
within the constraints of judicial precedent and stare decisis. It requires
a responsible use of history by advocates and jurists within these
constraints. Its purpose is not to overturn Heller’s acknowledgment of
an English common law right to armed self-defense in the home, for
only the Supreme Court has the authority to rewrite this version of
Second Amendment history, 41 even though it does not comport with the

36. Id.
37. Id. at 383.
38. See U.S. Term Limits v. Thornton, 514 U.S. 779, 788 (1995); City of Akron v. Akron Ctr.
for Reprod. Health, 462 U.S. 416, 458–59 (1983); Smith v. Allwright, 321 U.S. 649, 665-666 n.9-10
(1944); South Carolina v. Gathers, 490 U.S. 805, 825 (1989) (J. Scalia, J., dissenting); Church of
Lukumi Babalu Aye v. City of Hialeah, 508 U.S. 520, 574-75 (1985) (J. Souter, J., concurring in
part).
39. CORNEL WEST, THE AMERICAN EVASION OF PHILOSOPHY: A GENEALOGY OF
PRAGMATISM 70 (1989).
40. See supra note 33.
41. See supra note 38.
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historical consensus. 42 In other words, the “historical guidepost”
standard of review requires the inclusion of history through advocacy to
solve legal issues, cases and controversies. It does not serve or pretend
to serve as providing historical answers. It merely seeks to use history
responsibly and as an effective tool to analyze the “right to keep and
bear arms.”
In addition to establishing the framework of this judicial standard,
the second part of this study sets forth to address two key arguments that
were missing from the City of Chicago’s briefs. This includes: (1)
differentiating the importance of the right to “keep arms,” the right to
“bear arms,” and a “well-regulated militia” through State Second
Amendment analogues circa 1789, 1803, and 1868, and (2) providing
the Court with historical evidence that the Fourteenth Amendment’s
chief architect, John Bingham, and the whole Reconstruction Congress
may have only intended to incorporate the Second Amendment as to
protect the right of citizens to take part in defending their liberties in a
“well-regulated militia.”
It is within the second part of this study where the methodology of
the “historical guidepost” standard of review partially divorces itself
from the rest of the study. The analyses of the right to “keep arms,” the
right to “bear arms,” and a “well-regulated militia” through State Second
Amendment analogues are effective tools under the “historical
guidepost” approach. However, the primary approach of this article is to
provide a key legal history argument that the City of Chicago did not
fully address in its brief or at oral arguments.
Meanwhile, the analysis of the Fourteenth Amendment ratifiers’
“popular understanding” of how the Second Amendment bound the
States through the Privileges or Immunities Clause works solely within
accepted historical methodologies. It seeks to expound the argument
that the historical record is incomplete as to whether the consensus
among the ratifiers was that the Second Amendment protected armed,
individual self-defense of the home. The answer as to what constitutes
“popular understanding” circa 1868 is not as clear and convincing as the
Heller majority and McDonald plurality would have it. The fact that
some members of Congress may have viewed the Second Amendment as
securing a right against private violence does not dictate how Congress
or “popular understanding” as a whole may have understood it. The
Amendment’s mention of a “well-regulated militia” and a “free State”
was often construed as protecting purely a militia right. Until a more

42. See supra note 15.
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exhaustive historical study is conducted, professional historians cannot
state with certainty what the drafters’ intent as a whole constituted.
II. LESSONS IN HISTORY: MCDONALD, HELLER, AND ESTABLISHING THE
HISTORICAL GUIDEPOST STANDARD FOR DETERMINING THE
CONSTITUTIONALITY OF GUN CONTROL REGULATIONS
In light of Heller, the use of some form of “historical guideposts” to
determine the constitutionality of gun control restrictions has been
common practice in recent court decisions.43 These courts have
rationalized that since the Heller majority used “original meaning” to
determine the right to “keep and bear arms,” the logical starting point, as
to whether a restriction is constitutional, is to examine it in the historical
constraints as understood at the founding. The Seventh Circuit Court of
Appeals seems to be the first to establish a form of the “historical
guidepost” standard of review in the first ruling of United States v.
Skoien:
[W]e read Heller as establishing the following general approach to
Second Amendment cases. First, some gun laws will be valid because
they regulate conduct that falls outside the terms of the right as
publicly understood when the Bill of Rights was ratified. If the
government can establish this, then the analysis need go no further. If,
however, a law regulates conduct falling within the scope of the right,
then the law will be valid (or not) depending on the government's
ability to satisfy whatever level of means-end scrutiny is held to apply;
the degree of fit required between the means and the end will depend
on how closely the law comes to the core of the right and the severity
of the law's burden on the right. 44

43. See District of Columbia v. Heller, 128 S. Ct. 2783, 2816-17 (2008). For courts following
this standard, see United States v. Rene, 583 F.3d 8, 11-12 (1st Cir. 2009) ([The court first looked]
to nineteenth century state laws imposing similar restrictions, as the Heller Court did.); United
States v. Skoien, 587 F.3d 803, 808-09 (7th Cir. 2009), vacated, reh’g en banc, No. 08-3770, 2010
U.S. App. LEXIS 6584 (7th Cir. Feb 22, 2010), and on reh’g en banc No. 08-3770, 2010 WL
2735747 (7th Cir. July 13, 2010); United States v. Chester, No. 09-4084, 2010 U.S. App. LEXIS
3739, at *16-19 (4th Cir. 2010) (unpublished opinion) (following the Seventh Circuit Court of
Appeals in Skoien); United States v. Tooley, No. 3:09-00194, 2010 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 58591, at *17
(S.D. WV June 14, 2010) (“To determine the appropriate level of review, this Court will engage in a
historical analysis of the Second Amendment as it would apply to 18 U.S.C. s 922(g)(9).”); United
States v. Walker, No. 3:10CR358-HEH, 2010 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 39473, at *11-12 (E.D. Va. Apr.
21, 2010); United States v. Brown, No. 3:09cr339, 2010 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 51515, at *21-29 (E.D.
Va. May 25, 2010) (discussing the history of the arms restrictions at the Founding).
44. Skoien, 587 F.3d at 808-09 (emphasis in original).
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To paraphrase, the Seventh Circuit believed that judicial deference
should be given to historical Anglo-American restraints on “arms.” It is
only when the government cannot provide an accepted Anglo-American
restraint, as understood by the founding fathers, that the court will
undertake further review. In United States v. Chester, the Fourth Circuit
Court of Appeals followed this standard of review, determining that
because the plaintiff was not a “law-abiding, responsible citizen” that he
was “at least one step ‘removed from the core constitutional right’”
recognized in Heller. 45 Naturally, using “historical guideposts” to
determine the constitutionality of gun control laws can be viewed as
questionable given that the Skoien decision was vacated and Chester was
unpublished.
However, the Seventh Circuit Court of Appeals recently upheld the
“historical guidepost” approach in its Skoien en banc decision. 46 Not to
mention, other circuits agree with the use of “historical guideposts”
because they have adopted similar approaches. In United States v. Rene,
the First Circuit Court of Appeals agreed it was important to look at
nineteenth century state laws as the Heller Court did, and rested its
“conclusion on the existence of longstanding tradition of prohibiting
juveniles from both receiving and possessing handguns[.]” 47 Recently,
the Third Circuit Court of Appeals agreed with a “historical guidepost”
approach when it held, “If the Second Amendment codified a preexisting right to bear arms, it codified the pre-ratification understanding
of that right.” 48
Numerous district courts are similarly adopting “historical
guideposts” as a standard of review. For instance, in United States v.
Walker and United States v. Brown, the United States District Court for
the Eastern District Court of Virginia has adopted the use of “historical

45. Chester, 2010 U.S. App. LEXIS 3739, at *18.
46. United States v. Skoien, No. 08-3770, 2010 U. S. App. LEXIS 14262, at *6 (7th Cir. July
13, 2010) (“[F]or current purposes . . . the legislative role did not end in 1791. That some
categorical limits are proper is part of the original meaning, leaving to the people’s elected
representatives the filling in the details.”); id. at 35 (Sykes, J., dissenting) (“[M]y colleagues elide
the historical-scope question; they do not decide whether persons convicted of a domestic violence
misdemeanor are completely “outside the reach” of the Second Amendment as a matter of
founding-era history.”). See also United States v. Williams, No. 09-3174, 2010 WL 3035483, at *5
(7th Cir. Aug. 5, 2010) (also upholding the “two step approach” with the first step examining
“whether the challenged conduct falls within the scope of the Second Amendment’s protection . . .
at the founding”).
47. Rene, 583 F.3d at 12.
48. United States v. Marzzarella, No. 09-3185, 2010 U.S. App. LEXIS 15655, at *13 (3rd Cir.
July 29, 2010).
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guideposts” as “compelling.” 49 Meanwhile in United States v. Tooley,
the United States District Court for the Southern District of West
Virginia found the use of “historical understanding” as being “based
upon the plain language in Heller, and is consistent with the approach
taken by courts in analyzing protections for freedom of speech under the
First Amendment.” 50
Unfortunately, the use of “historical guideposts” has been applied
differently and inconsistently. For instance, the First Circuit gave
substantial deference to the fact that juvenile restrictions had
traditionally existed in the nineteenth century when coming to its
determination. 51 In contrast, the Seventh Circuit’s vacated decision in
Skoien took more of a historical parallel approach by comparing
domestic violence misdemeanants to Founding-Era restrictions,
concluding that there was no exact historical comparison. 52 The Walker
court similarly took this narrow approach by determining “it would have
made little sense for the Founders” to place gun control restrictions
based on the nature of the offense and “length of incarceration as is done
today.” 53 Meanwhile, the Tooley court used “historical guideposts” to
determine whether the restriction was “outside the ‘core’ of the right—in
which case lesser review than strict scrutiny would most likely be
appropriate.” 54 In other words, the Tooley court used historical parallels
as the means to quantify a constitutional standard of scrutiny.
Given the unpredictable nature of the use of “historical guideposts,”
one may argue that a different standard should be used to examine future
Second Amendment challenges. 55 Based on the plurality opinion in

49. Walker, 2010 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 39473, at *10; see also Brown, 2010 U.S. Dist. LEXIS
51515, at *21-29.
50. United States v. Tooley, No. 3:09-00194, 2010 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 58591, at *18 (S.D. WV
June 14, 2010).
51. Rene, 583 F.3d at 11-13.
52. The court failed to find a perfect fit and went to the second part of its test. See United
States v. Skoien, 587 F.3d 803, 810-11 (7th Cir. 2009). The Skoien en banc decision skipped the
Founding-Era historical review, stating “the legislative role did not end in 1791.” Skoien, 2010 U.S.
App. LEXIS 14262, at *6.
53. Walker, 2010 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 39473, at *13.
54. Tooley, 2010 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 58591, at *18. See also id. at *18 n.4 (“The historical
treatment of the regulated conduct guides the determination of the extent to which a core right, or
something less, is implicated.”).
55. For other commentary on standards of review after Heller, see Adam Winkler, Heller’s
Catch-22, 56 UCLA L. REV. 1551 (2009); Eugene Volokh, Implementing the Right to Keep and
Bear Arms for Self-Defense: An Analytical Framework and a Research Agenda, 56 UCLA L. REV.
1443 (2009); Lawrence Rosenthal, Second Amendment Plumbing After Heller: Of Standards of
Scrutiny, Incorporation, Well-Regulated Militias, and Criminal Street Gangs, 41 URB. LAW. 1
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McDonald v. City of Chicago, however, the Supreme Court disagrees.
Justice Alito’s plurality opinion joined by Chief Justice Roberts, Justice
Scalia, and Justice Kennedy acquiesced to the continuance of Heller’s
“historical guidepost” framework. They all agreed that the “Fourteenth
Amendment has not been historically understood to restrict the authority
of the States to regulate firearms” within constitutional restraints.56 The
opinion went on to affirm that the Second Amendment is not historically
a right “to keep and carry any weapon whatsoever and for whatever
purpose.” 57
Furthermore, similar to his majority opinion in Heller, Justice
Scalia’s concurring opinion unequivocally supports using “historical
guideposts” to determine the constitutionality of gun control laws.
Writing in response to Justice Stevens’ dissent, Scalia confirms that the
“traditional restrictions [on arms] go to show the scope of the right” just
as history helps to define “other rights.” 58 Scalia concedes that
conducting “historical analysis can be difficult,” and will sometimes
require courts to resolve “threshold questions, and mak[e] nuanced
judgments about which evidence to consult and how to interpret it.” 59
However, he believes the historical method need not be the “perfect
means . . . but whether it is the best means available in an imperfect
world.” 60 In particular, Scalia prefers “historical guideposts” because:
In the most controversial matters brought before this Court . . . any
historical methodology, under any plausible standard of proof, would
lead to the same conclusion.
Moreover, the methodological
differences that divide historians, and the varying interpretative
assumptions they bring to their work, are nothing compared to the
differences among the American people[.] 61

Thus, according to the McDonald plurality, it is a requisite that
courts use “historical guideposts”—longstanding historical restrictions
on the “keeping” or “bearing” of arms circa 1791 or a longstanding
political or philosophical ideology for regulating or restricting the

(2009); Darrell A.H. Miller, Guns as Smut: Defending the Home-Bound Second Amendment, 109
COLUM L. REV. 1278 (2009).
56. McDonald v. City of Chicago, 130 S. Ct. 3020 (2010).
57. Id. (quoting District of Columbia v. Heller, 128 S. Ct. 2783, 2816-17 (2008). The
plurality and Justice Thomas also confirmed that the longstanding restrictions were constitutionally
permissible. Id. at 3059-88.
58. Id. at 3056 (emphasis in original).
59. Id. at 3057.
60. Id. at 3057-58 (emphasis in original).
61. Id. at 3058 (emphasis in original).
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“keeping” or “bearing” of arms circa 1791—when analyzing the
constitutional scope of the Second Amendment. This still leaves one
very important question: “What should a responsible and effective
historical guidepost standard look like?”
A.

The “Historical Guidepost” Standard of Review

As was seen by the conflicting views in the First, Third, Fourth,
and Seventh Circuit Court of Appeals, and the subsequent federal district
courts, “historical guideposts” have been applied inconsistently. 62
Despite this fact, all the courts seem to be in concurrence with one
important fact; there is a two-part test in determining the
constitutionality of gun control laws. 63 The test stipulates that if history
cannot answer whether a restriction is constitutionally permissive,
differing degrees of scrutiny should apply dependent upon how close the
restriction is to the “core” of the Heller right. 64 Regarding the second
part of this test, the Seventh Circuit in Skoien held, “the degree of fit
required between the means and the end will depend on how closely the
law comes to the core of the right and the severity of the law's burden on
the right.” 65 In making this determination the court can use “historical
guideposts” to mitigate or enhance the level of scrutiny. 66
While this study will not seek to provide an exhaustive study as to
the differing levels of scrutiny in the second part of the “historical
guidepost” standard of review, it will acknowledge a few caveats. First,
it is well-established that Justice Breyer’s interest balancing approach
has been denounced by both the Heller majority and McDonald
plurality. 67 Second, given that the McDonald plurality only recognized,
incorporated, and ranked as “fundamental” the limited right expounded
in Heller, 68 the Supreme Court seems to have only acquiesced to “strict
scrutiny” applying towards regulations that expressly diminish the

62. See supra notes 51-54 and accompanying text.
63. See supra note 43; United States v. Marzzarella, No. 09-3185, 2010 U.S. App. LEXIS
15655, at *12-13 (3rd Cir. July 29, 2010).
64. United States v. Tooley, No. 3:09-00194, 2010 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 58591, at *18 (S.D. WV
June 14, 2010
65. United States v. Skoien, 587 F.3d 803, 809 (7th Cir. 2009), vacated, reh’g en banc, No.
08-3770, 2010 U.S. App. LEXIS 6584, *4-5 (7th Cir. Feb 22, 2010), and on reh’g en banc No. 083770, 2010 WL 2735747 (7th Cir. July 13, 2010).
66. For the most detailed application of this standard, see Tooley, 2010 U.S. Dist. LEXIS
58591, at *18-35.
67. District of Columbia v. Heller, 128 S. Ct. 2783, 2821 (2008); McDonald v. City of
Chicago, 130 S. Ct. 3020, 3050 (2010).
68. McDonald, 130 S. Ct. at 3036-48.
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limited right recognized in Heller. In other words, “strict scrutiny” may
only apply to restrictions that aim to prevent a “law-abiding” citizen
from exercising the right of armed self-defense in the home with a
handgun.
What this study will seek to provide is a workable and responsible
analysis for the courts in answering the first part of the “historical
guidepost” standard of review, for without it, judges will be forced to
weigh history that they may not be familiar with.69 It is this lack of
professional historical training that may lead courts to “point in any
direction the judges favor.” 70 As Justice Stevens noted in his McDonald
dissent, “It is not the role of federal judges to be amateur historians.” 71
His comment was not meant to “criticize judges’ use of history in
general or to suggest that it always generates indeterminable
answers[.]” 72 Instead, Stevens’ point was that the McDonald plurality
provided no guidance as to which historical “pieces to credit and which
to discount, and then . . . assemble them into a coherent whole.”73
The “historical guidepost” standard of review assuages such
concerns. It seeks to work within the constraints of judicial precedent
and stare decisis. It requires the responsible use of history by advocates
and jurists to solve legal issues, cases, and controversies. It does not
serve or pretend to serve as providing definitive historical answers. It
merely seeks to use history responsibly and as an effective tool to
analyze the “right to keep and bear arms” through the lens of “historical
guideposts.” For the purposes of analyzing the Second Amendment, a
“historical guidepost” is either a longstanding historical restriction on
the “keeping” or “bearing” of arms or a longstanding ideology for
regulating or restricting the “keeping” or “bearing” of arms. This
standard is in line with both the vacated and en banc Skoien decisions. 74
It requires the courts give federal and state governments some deference
to adopt gun restrictions that fall within traditional and historical areas of
regulation as would have been publicly accepted by the founding

69. One legal dilemma for judges is that historians and lawyers ask different questions. See
Eric Foner, The Second Founding: Remarks at the Conference on the Second Founding, 11 U. PA. J.
CONST. L. 1289, 1290 (2008).
70. McDonald, 130 S. Ct. at 3058. See also generally Cornell, supra note 15.
71. McDonald, 130 S. Ct. at 3119.
72. Id. at 3118.
73. Id. at 3117.
74. United States v. Skoien, 587 F.3d 803, 808-09 (7th Cir. 2009), vacated, reh’g en banc,
No. 08-3770, 2010 U.S. App. LEXIS 6584, *4-5 (7th Cir. Feb 22, 2010), and on reh’g en banc No.
08-3770, 2010 WL 2735747 (7th Cir. July 13, 2010).
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fathers. 75 As the Third Circuit Court of Appeals held in United States v.
Marzzarella, the threshold question is not whether there is a perfect
historical parallel, but whether it was “commonly understood at the time
of ratification,” for “the Second Amendment codified a pre-existing right
to bear arms . . . [and] the pre-ratification understanding of that right.”76
Restrictions that generally fall within this framework are those
designed to protect the public against injury, 77 and regulations on aliens,
both documented and undocumented,78 hunting, 79 felons and the

75. McDonald, 130 S. Ct. at 3118 (Stevens’ dissent argues that the plurality’s view is that
public understanding at the founding controls interpretation); District of Columbia v. Heller, 128 S.
Ct. 2783, 2821 (2008) (“Constitutional rights are enshrined with the scope they were understood to
have when the people adopted them”). For the argument that the best way to understand the
founders’ “popular understanding” of the right to arms and the Second Amendment is through an
historical examination of contemporaneous laws, see CHARLES, THE SECOND AMENDMENT, supra
note 15, at 17-34.
76. United States v. Marzzarella, No. 09-3185, 2010 U.S. App. LEXIS 15655, at *12-13 (3rd
Cir. July 29, 2010).
77. In 1534, Henry VIII passed a statute banning weapons from “any Place within the
Distance of two Miles from the same Sessions or Court, nor any Town, Church, Fair, Market or
other Congregation, except it be upon a Hute or Outcry[.]” 26 Hen. 8, c. 6 (1534) (Eng.). Even
after the 1689 Declaration of Rights “have arms” provision was codified as the English Bill of
Rights, Parliament and the crown maintained unfettered authority to disarm “dangerous and
disaffected persons.” Charles, “Arms for Their Defence,”? supra note 15, at 386-98. The
American colonies similarly disarmed those who would not profess their allegiance to Congress or
local governments. CHARLES, THE SECOND AMENDMENT, supra note 15, at 82-83; Charles, The
Constitutional Significance of a “Well-Regulated Militia,” supra note 15, at 18. See also AN ACT
IN ADDITION TO THE SEVERAL ACTS ALREADY MADE TO THE PRUDENT STORAGE OF GUN POWDER
WITHIN THE TOWN OF BOSTON (Mass. 1783); AN ACT TO IMPOWER THE CORPORATION OF THE
BOROUGH OF NORFOLK TO ASSESS A TAX ON THE INHABITANTS THEREOF, FOR THE PURPOSES
THEREIN MENTIONED (Va. 1772), reprinted in 8 VIRGINIA STATUTES AT LARGE 611-13 (William
Walter Hening ed., 1821); THE ADDRESS AND REASONS OF DISSENT OF THE MINORITY OF THE
CONVENTION OF THE STATE OF PENNSYLVANIA, TO THEIR CONSTITUENTS (Dec. 17, 1787) (“That
the people have a right to bear arms for the defence of themselves and their own state . . . unless for
crimes committed, or real danger of public injury from individuals.”).
78. The entire legal premise for excluding aliens from the right to “keep and bear arms” was
being a member of the political community. In other words, the doctrine of allegiance, as
prescribed by the government according to their respective spheres, controls whether aliens can
enjoy the right with citizens. For doctrine of allegiance in prescribing the rights of aliens within the
constraints of the Plenary Power Doctrine, see generally Patrick J. Charles, The Plenary Power
Doctrine and the Constitutionality of Ideological Exclusion: A Historical Perspective, 15 TEX. REV.
L.
&
POL
(Forthcoming
Fall
2010),
available
at
http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=1618976. For the importance of being a
member of the political community to bear arms, see generally Charles, The Constitutional
Significance of a “Well-Regulated Militia,” supra note 15. See also THE INDEPENDENT GAZETTEER
(Philadelphia, PA), Sept. 23, 1786, at 3, col.2 (“To instruct vagabonds, servants, or slaves, in the
military art, and even arm them at the expence of the state, will be the worst policy.”);
INSTRUCTIONS FOR THE OFFICERS OF SEVERAL REGIMENTS OF THE MASSACHUSETTS BAY
FORCES…10TH DAY OF JULY 1775 (1775) (“You are not to Enlist any Person who is not an
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mentally ill,80 the carrying of arms in public, 81 concealed weapons, 82
limiting the types of arms individuals may possess,83 the transportation

American-born, unless such Person has a Wife and Family, and is a settled Resident in this
Country.”).
79. Charles, “Arms for Their Defence,”? supra note 15, at 386-98 (discussing the Anglo
understanding of hunting restrictions); CHARLES, THE SECOND AMENDMENT, supra note 15, at 2021 (discussing that neither “bear arms” nor “keep arms” was ever used in hunting restrictions
preceding, contemporaneous, or immediately following the adoption of the Constitution). In fact,
one Maryland law made it unlawful for an individual to use his militia arms for hunting. A
SUPPLEMENT TO THE ACT ENTITLED, AN ACT TO REGULATE AND DISCIPLINE THE MILITIA OF THIS
STATE, § 30 (Md. 1799) (“[A]ny private or non commissioned officer, to whom a musket is
delivered, shall use the same for hunting, gunning or fowling, or shall not keep his arms . . . in neat
and clean order . . . shall” pay a fine). For examples of other hunting restrictions, see AN ACT FOR
THE PRESERVATION OF THE BREED OF WILD DEER (Md. 1729); AN ACT FOR MORE EFFECTUAL
PRESERVATION OF THE BREED OF DEER (Md. 1773); AN ACT FOR THE PRESERVATION OF THE
BREED OF WILD DEER, AND FOR OTHER PURPOSES THEREIN (Md., November 1789); AN ACT TO
PREVENT KILLING OF DEER OUT OF SEASON AND AGAINST CARRYING GUNS AND HUNTING BY
PERSONS NOT QUALIFIED (N.J. 1722); A SUPPLEMENTARY ACT TO THE ACT ENTITLED, “AN ACT TO
PREVENT THE KILLING OF DEER OUT OF SEASON AND AGAINST CARRYING GUNS AND HUNTING BY
PERSONS NOT QUALIFIED” (N.J. 1751); AN ACT FOR THE PRESERVATION OF DEER AND OTHER
GAME, AND TO PREVENT TRESPASSING WITH GUNS (N.J. 1771); AN ACT TO PREVENT HUNTING
WITH FIRE-ARMS IN THE CITY OF NEW-YORK, AND THE LIBERTIES THEREOF (N.Y. 1763); AN ACT
TO AMEND AN ACT ENTITLED, “AN ADDITIONAL ACT TO AN ACT, ENTITLED, AN ACT TO PREVENT
KILLING DEER AT UNREASONABLE TIMES AND FOR PUTTING A STOP TO MANY ABUSES
COMMITTED BY WHITE PERSONS UNDER THE PRETENCE OF HUNTING (N.C. 1766); AN ACT TO
PREVENT THE KILLING OF DEER OUT OF SEASON, AND AGAINST CARRYING OF GUNS OR HUNTING
BY PERSONS NOT QUALIFIED (Pa. 1721); AN ACT TO PREVENT THE HUNTING OF DEER . . . AND
AGAINST KILLING DEER OUT OF SEASON (Pa. 1760); AN ACT FOR THE PRESERVATION OF DEER,
AND TO PREVENT THE MISCHIEFS ARISING FROM HUNTING AT UNREASONABLE TIMES (S.C. 1769).
80. AN ACT FOR THE SPEEDY TRIAL OF CRIMINALS, AND ASCERTAINING THEIR PUNISHMENT
IN THE COUNTY COURTS WHEN PROSECUTED THERE, AND FOR THE PAYMENT OF FEES DUE FROM
CRIMINAL PERSONS (Md. 1715) (“[A]ny person or persons whatsoever, that have been convicted of
the crimes aforesaid, or other crimes, or that shall be of the same evil, or a vagrant, or dissolute
liver, that shall shoot, kill or hunt, or seen to carry a gun, upon any person’s land . . . shall forfeit
and pay one thousand pounds of tobacco.”); THE ADDRESS AND REASONS OF DISSENT OF THE
MINORITY OF THE CONVENTION OF THE STATE OF PENNSYLVANIA, TO THEIR CONSTITUENTS (1787)
(“That the people have a right to bear arms for the defence of themselves and their own state . . .
unless for crimes committed, or real danger of public injury from individuals.”). See also THE BILL
OF RIGHTS: A DOCUMENTARY HISTORY 675 (B. Schwartz ed., 1971) (Samuel stated the right to
arms should “never [be] construed . . . to prevent the people of the United States citizens who are
peaceable citizens, from keeping their own arms.”); MASSACHUSETTS SPY (Boston, MA), Mar. 28,
1771, at 14, col. 3 (“Justly does the law presume that every wrong is committed with force and
arms: for every wrong inferred being against the peace, must require force to support it. As force
therefore must in one shape or other, be repelled by force, it clearly follows, that there must be
somewhere in civil society, a force sufficient to protect the honest, industrious and peaceable
citizen.”); JAMES DAVIS, THE OFFICE AND AUTHORITY OF A JUSTICE OF THE PEACE 13 (Newbern,
James Davis 1774) (“[A]ny Justice of the Peace may command Weapons to be taken from a
Prisoner brought before him”).
81. Such restrictions can be found in laws concerning riots, tumults, and assemblies of
persons in arms, see AN ACT TO PREVENT ROUTS, RIOTS, AND TUMULTUOUS ASSEMBLIES, AND THE
EVIL CONSEQUENCES THEREOF, SEPTEMBER SESSION, CHAPTER VIII (Mass. 1786); AN ACT FOR
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MORE SPEEDY AND EFFECTUAL SUPPRESSION OF TUMULTS AND INSURRECTIONS IN THE
COMMONWEALTH, SEPTEMBER SESSION, CHAPTER IX (Mass. 1787); AN ACT TO PREVENT ROUTS,
RIOTS, AND TUMULTUOUS ASSEMBLIES (N.J. 1797); AN ACT TO PREVENT HUNTING WITH FIREARMS IN THE CITY OF NEW-YORK, AND THE LIBERTIES THEREOF (N.Y. 1763); AN ACT AGAINST
RIOTS AND RIOTERS (Pa. 1705). See also AN ACT TO RESTRAIN TAVERN-KEEPERS AND OTHERS
FROM SELLING STRONG LIQUORS TO SERVANTS . . . AND FROM HUNTING OR CARRYING A GUN ON
THE LORD’S DAY (N.J. 1751). At the same time, however, the government can require individuals
to carry arms for the public security similar to the hue & cry. See AN ACT TO OBLIGE THE MALE
WHITE PERSONS IN THE PROVINCE OF GEORGIA TO CARRY FIRE-ARMS IN ALL PLACES OF PUBLICK
WORSHIP (Ga. 1757); AN ACT FOR ESTABLISHING AND REGULATING PATROLS (Ga. 1757); AN ACT
FOR THE BETTER ESTABLISHING AND REGULATING OF PATROLS IN THIS PROVINCE (S.C. 1744);
DAVIS, supra note 80, at 13 (“Justices of the Peace, upon their own view, or upon Complaint, may
apprehend any Person who shall go or ride armed with unusual and offensive Weapons, in an
Affray, or among any great Concourse of the People, or who shall appear, so armed, before the
King’s Justices sitting in Court.”); JAMES PARKER, THE CONDUCTOR GENERALIS . . . ADAPTED TO
THESE UNITED STATES 11-12 (New York, John Patterson 1788) (“[T]hat no man cannot excuse the
wearing such armour in public, by alledging that such a one threatened him, and that he wears it for
the safety of his person from his assault.”); BURN’S ABRIDGEMENT, OR THE AMERICAN JUSTICE,
CONTAINING THE WHOLE PRACTICE, AUTHORITY AND DUTY OF JUSTICES OF THE PEACE, WITH
CORRECT FORMS OF PRECEDENTS RELATING THERETO, AND ADAPTED TO THE PRESENT SITUATION
IN THE UNITED STATES 22 (2d ed., Dover, Eliphalet Ladd 1792) (”[I]n some cases there may be an
affray, where there is no actual violence; as where a man arms himself with dangerous and unusual
weapons, in such a manner as will naturally cause terror to the people; which is said to have been
always an offence at the common law, and strictly prohibited by statute.”). See also supra notes 83,
85 for other sources.
82. 25 Edw. 3, St. 5, c. 2, § 13 (1350) (Eng.) (if “any Man of this Realm ride armed covertly
or secretly with Men of Arms against any other . . . shall be judge Treason”); 1 Jac.1, c. 8 (1603-4)
(Eng.) (also known as the Statute of Stabbing). For evidence that Edward III’s statute was still in
force in the United States, see FRANCOIS-XAVIER MARTIN, A COLLECTION OF STATUTES OF
PARLIAMENT OF ENGLAND IN FORCE IN THE STATES OF NORTH CAROLINA 60-61 (Newbern 1792)
(confirming that no person may go ride armed by night nor by day, in fairs, markets, nor in the
presence of the King’s Justices, or other ministers, nor in no part elsewhere); A COLLECTION OF ALL
SUCH ACTS OF THE GENERAL ASSEMBLY OF VIRGINIA, OF PUBLIC AND PERMANENT NATURE, AS
ARE NOW IN FORCE 33 (1794) (confirming that no person may go ride armed by night nor by day, in
fairs, markets, nor in the presence of the King’s Justices, or other ministers, nor in no part
elsewhere).
83. 33 Hen. 8, c. 6 (1541-42) (Eng.) (“Because people have “willfully and shamefully
committed, perpetrated and done diuerse detestable and shamefull murders, robberies, felonies, riots
and routs with Crossbowes, little short handguns, and little haquebuts, to the great peril and
continual feare and danger of the kings loving subjects.”); 33 Hen. 8, c. 6 (1541-42) (Eng.)
(requiring all lawful guns “being not the length of one whole yard, or haquebut, or demy hake,
being not of the length of three quarters of a year x. li. sterling.”). Writing in 1782, Granville Sharp
attested to the validity of such restrictions. See GRANVILLE SHARP, TRACTS, CONCERNING THE
ANCIENT AND ONLY TRUE LEGAL MEANS OF NATIONAL DEFENCE, BY A FREE MILITIA 17-18 (3d
ed. London, Dilly 1782); Charles, “Arms for Their Defence,”? supra note 15, at 411-14. For
evidence that Henry VIII’s statutes were still in place at the Founding Era, see 1 GILES JACOB, A
NEW LAW DICTIONARY, at “armour and arms” (T.E. Tomlins ed., London, Andrew Strahan 1797)
(citing 33 Hen. 8, c. 6 (1541-42) (Eng.) as a lawful restriction on 1 W. & M. 2, c. 2 (1688) (Eng.)); 1
GILES JACOB, THE LAW-DICTIONARY EXPLAINING THE RISE, PROGRESS, AND PRESENT STATE OF
THE ENGLISH LAW 123 (T.E. Tomlins ed., Philadelphia, P. Byrne 1811) (citing 33 Hen. 8, c. 6
(1541-42) (Eng.) as a lawful restriction on 1 W. & M. 2, c. 2 (1688) (Eng.)).
THE
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of arms, 84 and the discharging of arms in public. 85 With the exception of
regulations designed to prevent “public injury,” 86 regulations that fall
within these traditional restraints should be viewed under a rationale
basis standard of review. 87 In other words, traditional regulations circa
1791 should be analyzed under a low standard of scrutiny unless the
challenging party can show that the founding fathers would have thought
such regulations were not constitutionally permissible. It is when the
challenging party succeeds that the courts should move to step two.
Critics of this approach will argue that the McDonald plurality
defined the Second Amendment as a “fundamental” right and it should
be treated as such. 88 Therefore, they will argue that all regulations
should be examined according to the “strict scrutiny” standard of review
as are other enumerated “fundamental rights,” or at a minimum a
heightened “intermediate scrutiny” standard.89 This article does not
dispute that enumerated “fundamental” rights should be afforded higher
levels of scrutiny. However, neither the Heller majority nor the divided
McDonald plurality defined any Second Amendment rights as
84. At the founding it was well established that it was within the power of government to
prevent persons from going riding armed. 2 Edw. 3, c. 3 (1328) (“That no Man . . . [is] to go or nor
ride armed by Night nor by Day in Fairs, Markets, nor in the Presence of the Justices or other
Ministers nor in no Part elsewhere.”); 7 Rich. 2, c. 13 (1383) (Eng.); 20 Rich. 2, c. 1 (1396-97)
(Eng.).See also 4 WILLIAM BLACKSTONE, COMMENTARIES *148-49 (1769) (“The offence of riding
or going armed, with dangerous or unusual weapons, is a crime against the public peace, by
terrifying the good people of the land; and is particularly prohibited by the statute of Northampton,
2 Edw. 2, C.3 upon pain of forfeiture of arms.”).
85. For English examples, see 33 Hen. 8, c. 6 (1541-42) (Eng.) (limiting the shooting of arms
“to shoot with any Handgun Demie hake, or Haquebut at any Butt or Banke of earth only in place
convenient for the same”). For some American examples, see AN ACT TO PREVENT THE FIRING OF
GUNS, AND OTHER FIRE-ARMS WITHIN THIS COLONY (N.Y. 1773); AN ACT TO SUPPRESS THE
DISORDERLY PRACTICE OF FIRING GUNS, &C. ON THE TIMES THEREIN MENTIONED (Pa. 1774); AN
ACT FOR THE BETTER ORDERING AND GOVERNING OF THE NEGROES AND OTHER SLAVES IN THIS
PROVINCE, XXIII (S.C. 1740); AN ACT FOR SUPPRESSING AND PROHIBITING EVER SPECIES OF
GAMING…AND ALSO FOR RESTRAINING THE DISORDERLY PRACTICE OF DISCHARGING FIRE ARMS
AT CERTAIN HOURS AND PLACES (Ohio 1790); 1 VIRGINIA STATUTES AT LARGE 228, 248, 261, 437,
480 (William Walter Hening ed., New York 1823) (laws against shooting); 2 VIRGINIA STATUTES
AT LARGE 126 (William Walter Hening ed., New York 1823) (laws against shooting).
86. See supra note 77.
87. This article understands that the Heller majority rejected adopting a baseline “rational
basis” standard of review for examining the constitutionality of gun restrictions. District of
Columbia v. Heller, 128 S. Ct. 2783, 2818 n.27 (2008). However, the majority also acquiesced to
“longstanding prohibitions.” See id. at 2816-17. Thus, this article argues if certain types of
regulations were accepted by the public in the late eighteenth century, in what many Individual
Right Scholars characterize as an era of liberal gun possession and use, it must certainly pass
constitutional muster today.
88. McDonald v. City of Chicago, 130 S. Ct. 3020, 3036.
89. See Robert A. Levy, Second Amendment Redux: Scrutiny, Incorporation, and the Heller
Paradox,33 HARV. J. L. & PUB. POL’Y 203, 208 (2010).
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“fundamental” other than “the right to possess a handgun in the home for
the purpose of self-defense,” 90 and the Court has yet to revisit the
Second Amendment in the constraints of a “well-regulated militia”
right. 91
This begets the important question, “What if a traditional restriction
on arms expressly conflicts with the limited right recognized in Heller?”
On its face, it seems that restrictions on felons, criminals, the mentally
ill, and aliens possessing handguns for defense of the home would
qualify in this regard. However, the Heller majority made it clear that
the right only extends to “law-abiding, responsible citizens to use arms
in defense of hearth and home.” 92 In other words, the Heller majority
acquiesced to the longstanding ideological restraints for the “keeping” or
“bearing” of arms—a factor that the “historical guidepost” standard
takes into account. What qualifies as a “law-abiding” citizen can be
debated back and forth, but longstanding ideological restraints can
definitively provide courts with a strong historical and philosophical
base to work from.
Naturally, this still leaves one historical and traditional restriction
without an affirmative judicial standard of review. Specifically, the
government has been traditionally allowed to pass firearms restrictions
as to prevent “public injury.” Given the broad nature of what may
qualify as a constitutionally permissible restriction to protect the public
from “injury,” restrictions that fall squarely within or intimately relate to
this category should be given a slightly heightened form of scrutiny than
that of the other historical or traditional restrictions—a low to medium
level of intermediate scrutiny. This standard is based on the popular
understanding of the Founders’ right to arms. In other words, “public
injury” restrictions should not warrant “strict scrutiny” unless the
“public injury” restriction expressly restricts the limited right recognized
in Heller. 93 Support for adopting this standard for traditional “public
injury” restrictions can be found in the Heller majority’s reliance 94 on
the Pennsylvania Minority proposal, which states:

90. McDonald, 130 S. Ct. at 3050.
91. See Houston v. Moore, 18 U.S. 1, 53 (Story, J., dissenting) (stating that the Second
Amendment “confirms and illustrates” the States’ concurrent authority over the militia, “rather than
impugns” it); Presser v. Illinois, 116 U.S. 252, 265 (1886) (stating that State regulations limiting the
assemblage, training, or discharging of arms would not violate the Second Amendment because it
does not “prohibit the people from keeping and bearing arms, so as to deprive the United States of
their rightful resource for maintaining the public security”).
92. Heller, 128 S. Ct. at 2821, 2831.
93. See infra note 94 and accompanying text.
94. Heller, 128 S. Ct. at 2804.
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That the people have a right to bear arms for the defence of themselves
and their own state, or the United States, or for the purpose of killing
game, and no law shall be passed for disarming the people or any of
them, unless for crimes committed, or real danger of public injury
from individuals; and as standing armies in time of peace are
dangerous to liberty, they ought not be kept up; and that the military
shall be kept under strict subordination to and governed by the civil
powers. 95

The Heller majority’s classification of the proposal as “highly
influential” 96 gives credence to the legal argument that even broad
individual and state rights proponents “viewed the right to possess and
carry arms as limited—particularly from those who had committed
crimes or were a danger to the public.” 97 What is also legally significant
is that the Minority’s proposal does not protect a right to “keep arms.” 98

95. THE ADDRESS AND REASONS OF DISSENT OF THE MINORITY OF THE CONVENTION OF THE
STATE OF PENNSYLVANIA, TO THEIR CONSTITUENTS (Dec. 17, 1787) (emphasis in original).
96. Heller, 128 S. Ct. at 2804. The Minority Report is especially important because it is a
provision that Individual Right advocates have consistently relied on to support their understanding
of the right to arms. It was one of their main arguments supporting an individual right even though
its language was not included in the Second Amendment. However, while they embrace the
“defence of themselves” and “hunting” language they cast aside the rest of the proposal. One
cannot have it both ways. See David B. Kopel, The Second Amendment in the Nineteenth Century,
1998 BYU L. REV. 1359, 1406-7 (1998) (“[W]e know that ‘bear’ was used with a broad meaning in
one of the key documents that gave birth to the Second Amendment: the minority report from the
Pennsylvania ratifying convention. The minority demanded constitutional protection for the right of
the people ‘to bear arms for the defense of themselves and their own state, or the United States, or
for the purpose of killing game.’ Hunting—‘killing game’—is obviously a personal, non-militia
purpose for which one could ‘bear arms.’”); Nelson Lund, The Past and Future of the Individual’s
Right to Arms, 31 GA. L. REV. 1, 59-60 (1996) (“[T]hose responsible for the adoption of the Second
Amendment generally accepted the individual right of self-defense as the natural basis for the right
to arms. Like Blackstone . . . the people who gave us the Second Amendment drew no fundamental
distinction between an individual's right to defend himself against a robber or a marauding Indian
and that same individual's right to band together with others in a state regulated militia. The
inseparability of these concepts was reflected in two early state constitutions . . . [including] the
Anti-Federalist minority at the Pennsylvania ratifying convention.”); Stephen P. Halbrook, St.
George Tucker’s Second Amendment: Deconstructing “The True Palladium of Liberty,” 3 TENN. J.
L. & POL’Y 120, 159-60 (2007).
97. United States v. Tooley, No. 3:09-00194, 2010 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 58591, at *28 (S.D. WV
June 14, 2010). For support for this interpretation, see CHARLES, THE SECOND AMENDMENT, supra
note 15, at 40; Charles, “Arms for Their Defence,”? supra note 15, at 365-66, 373-73, 376, 382-83,
405 (discussing how the government retained unfettered authority to disarm “dangerous and
disaffected persons” despite the 1689 Declaration of Rights “have arms” provision).
98. By 1792, only one state constitution protected the right to “keep arms,” and that was for
the “common defence.” MASS. CONST. OF 1780, art. XVII (“The people have a right to keep and
bear arms for the common defence.”). See also David Thomas Konig, Arms and the Man: What
Did the Right to “Keep” Arms Mean in the Early Republic?, 25 LAW & HIST. REV. 177 (2007)
(discussing that “keep arms” was not an unfettered right).
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Historically, who may “keep arms” was an issue that had always been a
matter of state sovereignty conditioned on allegiance to the laws and
government. 99 This is supported by 1789 and 1803 State Second
Amendment analogues, which omit the right to “keep arms” except in
reference to the “common defence” or the “State.” See Chart I (“State
Second Amendment Analogues Circa 1803”).
Perhaps what makes the Minority’s proposal so “highly influential”
for courts in analyzing restrictions on “arms” is the fact that it was
published throughout the colonies 100 and not one reply disputed its
contentions on the disarming of criminals or restrictions to prevent
“public injury.” 101 It seems only Noah Webster, signing under the pen
name America, addressed the Minority’s understanding of arms within
the constraints of the federal Constitution. However, Webster only
addressed the subject through the auspices of hunting, and chastised the
Minority for even asserting a right to hunt:
But to complete the list of unalienable rights, you would insert a clause
in your declaration, that every body shall, in good weather, hunt on his
own land, and catch fish in rivers that are public property. Here,
Gentlemen, you must have exerted the whole force of your genius!
Not even the all-important subject of legislating for a world can
restrain my laughter at this clause! As a supplement to that article of
your bill of rights, I would suggest the following restriction: “That
Congress shall never restrain any inhabitant of America from eating
and drinking, at seasonable times, or prevent his lying on his left side,
in a long winter’s night, or even on his back, when he is fatigued by
lying on his right.” . . . But to be more serious Gentlemen, you must

99. Charles, The Constitutional Significance of a “Well-Regulated Militia,” supra note 15, at
43. See also infra note 207 and accompanying text (discussing “keep arms” in State constitutions).
100. PENNSYLVANIA EVENING HERALD (Philadelphia, PA), Dec. 15, 1787, at 2, cols. 4-5; THE
INDEPENDENT GAZETTEER (Philadelphia, PA), Dec. 17, 1787, at 2; THE FREEMAN’S JOURNAL
(Philadelphia, PA), Dec. 19, 1787, at 1, cols. 1-3; THE CARLISLE GAZETTE (Carlisle, PA), Dec. 26,
1787, at 3, cols. 1-3; THE DAILY ADVERTISER (New York, NY), Dec. 22, 1787, at 2, cols. 2-4; THE
PROVIDENCE GAZETTE AND COUNTRY JOURNAL, Jan. 19, 1788, at 1, cols. 1-3; THE PROVIDENCE
GAZETTE AND COUNTRY JOURNAL, Jan. 26, 1788, at 1, cols. 1-3; THE UNITED STATES CHRONICLE
(Providence, RI), Feb. 14, 1788, at 4, cols. 1-2.
101. See THE INDEPENDENT GAZETTEER (Philadelphia, PA), Jan. 16, 1788, at 2, cols. 2-3; THE
CARLISLE GAZETTE (Carlisle, PA), Feb. 13, 1788, at 1, cols. 3-4; THE DAILY ADVERTISER (New
York, NY), Dec. 31, 1787, at 1, col. 4; THE DAILY ADVERTISER (New York, NY), Jan. 12, 1788, at
2, col. 2 (“The next consideration is, whether the liberties of the people will be safe under the
Constitution proffered to us by the late Convention? To determine this very important question, I
contend it is by no means necessary to go into a minute investigation of every part. It is amply
sufficient for this purpose, if a few leading principles have been carefully attended to.”); JAMES
MADISON, OBSERVATIONS UPON THE PROPOSED PLAN OF FEDERAL GOVERNMENT: WITH AN
ATTEMPT TO ANSWER SOME OF THE PRINCIPAL OBJECTIONS THAT HAVE BEEN MADE TO IT 23, 30-31
(Petersburg, VA 1788).
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have had in idea the forest-laws in Europe, when you inserted that
article; For no circumstances that ever took place in America, could
have suggested the thought of a declaration in favor of hunting and
fishing. Will you forever persist in error? . . . You may just as well ask
for a clause, giving license for every man to till his own land, or milk
his own cows. 102

To clarify how this differing “public injury” classification would
look in the constraints of the “historical guidepost” standard of review,
this article will examine the constitutionality of 18 U.S.C. § 922(g)(9),
which provides, “It shall be unlawful for any person . . . who has been
convicted in any court of a misdemeanor crime of domestic violence, to
. . . possess . . . any firearm.” Arguably, 18 U.S.C. § 922(g)(9) can be
viewed as a traditional restriction on felons, but for the purposes of this
article it will be viewed in the light of a “public injury” classification
because a recidivist violent misdemeanant does not historically or
legally equate with a felon.
Before analyzing § 922(g)(9), this article will use the “historical
guidepost” standard of review to analyze the historical restriction of
discharging firearms.
In particular, this article will address a
hypothetical law that restricts the shooting, firing, or discharging of
firearms with the exception of lawful self-defense in the home. To many
this law can seem like a reasonable restriction, but to others it may be
seen as an infringement on their property rights—both real and
personal—or as an infringement of their right to train to effectuate a
“well-regulated militia.”
B.

The Constitutionality of Regulations on Discharging of Firearms
Under the “Historical Guidepost Standard” of Review

As discussed above, traditional regulations that would have been
publicly accepted circa 1791 should be upheld unless the challenging
party can show that the founding fathers would have thought such
regulations were not constitutionally permissible. The threshold judicial
query is not whether the restriction at issue has a 1791 parallel, but
whether there is sufficient historical evidence to suggest that it was
publicly accepted. Perhaps in no area does the “historical guidepost”
standard of review control then to the discharging of firearms on public

102. THE DAILY ADVERTISER (New York, NY), Dec. 31, 1787, at 2, col. 3 (emphasis in
original). See also NOAH WEBSTER, A COLLECTION OF ESSAYS AND FUGITIVE WRITINGS: ON
MORAL, HISTORICAL, POLITICAL AND LITERARY SUBJECTS 149 (Scholars’ Facsimile & Reprints
1977) (1790).
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or private property. Limitations on the discharging of “arms” dates back
to 1541 when Parliament passed a statute limiting the firing of any
“Handgun Demie hake, or Haquebut” toonly a “Butt or Banke of earth . .
. convenient for the same.” 103
Naturally, public safety was the consideration in putting such a
restriction in place and the colonies passed similar laws with public
safety in mind. For instance, in 1773, New York made it unlawful for
“any Person or Persons of any Age or Quality” to “fire or discharge any
Gun, Pistol . . . or other Fire-work” in “any House, Barn, or other
Building, or before any Door, or in any Garden, Street, Lane, or other
Inclosure[.]” 104 Ten years earlier, New York had passed a similar
ordinance restricting the carrying or discharging of firearms on public
lands without a license. 105 It also prevented the carrying or discharging
of firearms on private lands unless authorized by the “Owner, Proprieter,
or Possessor[.]” 106
Surprisingly, the most expansive law concerning the discharging of
firearms in the United States was not in an established city such as
Boston, New York or Philadelphia, but on the expansive Northwestern
Territory. At a time when the Second Amendment would have directly
applied to this federal territory, a 1790 statute touched upon the
negligent discharging of firearms in populated areas such as “streets and
[in the] vicinity of cities, towns, villages and stations[.]” It stated:
That if any person shall presume to discharge or fire, or cause to be
discharged or fired, any gun or other fire-arms at any mark or object,
or upon any pretence whatever, unless he or she shall at the same time
be with such gun or fire-arms at the distance of at least one quarter of a
mile from the nearest building of any such city, town, village or
station, such person shall for every such offence, forfeit and pay to use
of the county in which the same shall be committed, a sum not
exceeding five dollars, nor less than one dollar. And if any person
being within a quarter of a mile of any city, town, village or station as
aforesaid, shall at the same time willfully discharge or fire any gun or
fire-arms, or cause to procure the same to be discharged or fired, at any
time after the setting of the sun and before the rising of the same, he or

103. 33 Hen. 8, c. 6 (1541-42) (Eng.).
104. AN ACT TO PREVENT THE FIRING OF GUNS, AND OTHER FIRE-ARMS WITHIN THIS COLONY
(N.Y. 1773).
105. AN ACT TO PREVENT HUNTING WITH FIRE-ARMS IN THE CITY OF NEW-YORK, AND THE
LIBERTIES THEREOF (N.Y. 1763).
106. Id.
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she so offending, shall in like manner pay to the use aforesaid, a sum
not exceeding five dollars, nor less than one dollar . . . . 107

At no point did the law deny the use of “arms” for lawful purposes
prescribed by the legislature, such as the Heller right of armed selfdefense in the home with a handgun, 108 for it stated:
That nothing herein contained shall be deemed or construed to extend
to any person lawfully using fire-arms as offensive or defensive
weapons, in annoying, or opposing a common enemy, or defending his
or her person or property, or the person or property of any other,
against the invasions or depredations of an enemy, or in support of the
laws and government; or against the attacks of rebels, highwaymen,
robbers, thieves, or other unlawfully assailing him or her, or in any
other manner where such opposition, defence, or resistance is allowed
by the law of the land. 109

Thus, given that laws governing the discharging of firearms in
private and public places were understood as permissible circa 1791,
courts can assume modern laws governing the subject are within the
constitutional constraints of the Second Amendment. Certainly, almost
all laws governing the discharging of firearms, including the placement
of limitations on the discharging of handguns for self-defense in the
home, would pass strict scrutiny. However, under the “historical
guidepost” standard of review the court can mitigate this scrutiny to a
“rational basis” standard of review.
The result does not change if one was to argue that laws preventing
the discharging of firearms are in violation of the Second Amendment’s
“well-regulated militia” guarantee. First, the Constitution prescribes that
the States have plenary authority to “train[] the Militia according to the
discipline prescribed by Congress.” 110 This authority includes the power
to prescribe the time, place, and manner in which the discharging of
firearms may take place to effectuate the national or state militias.111
Second, there are numerous historical examples that the individual
exercise and discharging of arms does not accomplish or effectuate a

107. AN ACT FOR SUPPRESSING AND PROHIBITING EVER SPECIES OF GAMING . . . AND ALSO
RESTRAINING THE DISORDERLY PRACTICE OF DISCHARGING FIRE ARMS AT CERTAIN HOURS
AND PLACES, § 4 (Ohio 1790).
108. At no point does the law use or incorporate a form of the phrase “bear arms.” CHARLES,
THE SECOND AMENDMENT, supra note 15, at 138. For a textual and historical analysis of the Ohio
right to “bear arms,” see id. at 133-57.
109. See supra note 107 (emphasis in original).
110. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8 cl. 16.
111. Presser v. Illinois, 116 U.S. 252, 267-68 (1886).

FOR
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“well-regulated militia.” 112 Lastly, any argument that grants people a
right to assemble and train as a militia, absent the consent of the political
branches, runs afoul of the founding principle that the military shall
always be subordinate to the civil authorities. 113
C.

The Constitutionality of 18 U.S.C. § 922(g)(9) Under the
“Historical Guidepost Standard” of Review

In the recent Skoien en banc decision, both the majority and the
dissent touched upon “historical guideposts” in determining the
constitutionality of 18 U.S.C. § 922(g)(9). The majority only briefly
addressed gun control circa 1791, citing the Pennsylvania Minority
proposal and laying the claim that the founders “did not extend this right
[to bear arms] to persons convicted of crime.” 114 However, the majority

112. See TIMOTHY PICKERING, AN EASY PLAN OF DISCIPLINE FOR A MILITIA, preface at 6
(Samuel & Ebenezer Hall, Salem 1775) (“An exercise ought to include not only every action
necessary to be performed in a day of battle, but also all such as may be useful on any other
occasion or duty . . . to keep the men alert, to save time, and to throw as many shot as possible at
your enemy, with uniformity, to prevent the interruptions of each other, the confusion and dangerous
accidents which would inevitably happen, if the men in close order took each his own way to
perform an action.”); WILLIAM BRETON, MILITIA DISCIPLINE, at “To the Reader” (2d ed., London
1717) (“[W]ithout [militia] practice, and exercise . . . the unskil[l]ful Bearers, but too often prove
Dangerous, and Hurtful, both to themselves, and Fellows, that Rank and File with them.”). See also
AN ACT FOR REGULATING AND GOVERNING THE MILITIA OF THE STATE OF VERMONT, AND FOR
REPEALING ALL LAWS HERETOFORE FOR THAT PURPOSE § 36 (Vt. 1793) (“Whereas the good
citizens of this State, are often injured by the discharge of single guns . . . no commissioned officer,
or private, shall unnecessarily fire a musket, or single gun, in any public road, or near any house, or
near the place of parade . . . unless embodied under the command of some officers.”); AN ACT FOR
FORMING AND REGULATING THE MILITIA WITHIN THE COMMONWEALTH OF
MASSACHUSETTS…FOR THAT PURPOSE, at 15 (Mass. 1781) (“That no Soldier . . . shall
unnecessarily discharge his Firelock from and after his appearing . . . on a Training or Muster-Day,
without the express Order or License of his Superior Officer.”); An Act for Establishing and
Conducting the Military Force of New Jersey § 53 (N.J. 1806), reprinted in MILITIA LAWS OF THE
UNITED STATES AND NEW JERSEY (Wilson & Halet, Trenton 1806) (“That it shall not be lawful for
any . . . private to come on parade with a loaded or charged musket.”).
113. This was frequently conveyed in State constitutions. See MASS. CONST. OF 1780,
DECLARATION OF RIGHTS, art. XVII (“The people have a right to keep and bear arms for the
common defence . . . and the military shall always be held in exact subordination to the civil
authority and governed by it.”); N.C. CONST. OF 1776, DECLARATION OF RIGHTS, art. XVII (“That
the people have a right to bear arms, for the defence of the State…the military should be kept under
strict subordination to, and governed by the civil power.”); OHIO CONST. of 1802 art. VIII, § 20
(“That the people have a right to bear arms for the defense of themselves and the state: and as
standing armies in time of peace, are dangerous to liberty, they shall not be kept up; and that the
military shall be kept under strict subordination to the civil power.”). See also Charles, The Right of
Self-Preservation and Resistance, supra note 15, at 31-34, 41-43, 47-49, 54, 58-59 (discussing the
politics and reasons concerning placing this power with the political branches).
114. United States v. Skoien, 587 F.3d 803 (7th Cir. 2009), vacated, reh’g en banc, No. 083770, 2010 U.S. App. LEXIS 6584, *6 (7th Cir. Feb. 22, 2010), and on reh’g en banc No. 08-3770,
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circumvented any further historical review. Implying the lack of a 1791
historical parallel, the court jumped to the second part of the “historical
guidepost standard” of review and analyzed § 922(g)(9) under a
heightened intermediate scrutiny standard.115
Meanwhile, the dissent gave more deference to the use of
“historical guideposts” in analyzing § 922(g)(9). While this article
agrees with the dissent that the en banc court should have given more
deference to the “historical guideposts,” it disagrees with the dissent’s
approach in compiling historical resources. What is particularly
concerning is that the dissent only cited analyses that support broad
protections of the right to arms and ignored longstanding ideological
restraints on the “keeping” or “bearing” of arms—the very judicial bias
that Justice Stevens was concerned with. 116
Another problem with the dissent’s analysis is that it utterly negates
the Pennsylvania Minority proposal by claiming that its
acknowledgement of governmental power to disarm persons for “crimes
committed” or who may be a “real danger” to “public injury” “did not
find its way into the Second Amendment.” 117 In support of this
argument, the dissent alludes to the fact that the 1791 Second
Amendment analogues did not exclude “persons convicted of crime.” 118
As will be shown in the next section and Chart I (“State Second
Amendment Analogues Circa 1803”), this kind of selective
interpretation of historical sources and State Second Amendment
analogues treads upon dangerous grounds. If the courts are to take
anything from the history of the right to arms 119 in State analogues circa

2010 WL 2735747 (7th Cir. July 13, 2010) (citing STEPHEN P. HALBROOK, THE FOUNDERS’
SECOND AMENDMENT 273, supra note 27 (2008)); C. Kevin Marshall, Why Can’t Martha Stewart
have a Gun?, 32 HARV. J.L. & PUB. POL’Y 695, 700-13 (2009).
115. Skoien, 2010 U. S. App. LEXIS 14262, at *8.
116. Stevens’ concern was the historical approach could still lead to judicial bias, because
judges will not know which “pieces to credit and which to discount, and then . . . assemble them
into a coherent whole.” McDonald v. City of Chicago, 130 S. Ct. 3020, 3117 (2010).The dissent
did not cite or incorporate the work of one Ph.D. Historian specializing in Anglo-American legal
history or Colonial/Early American history or a work that has gained the support of historical
academia in its historical analysis. See Skoien, 2010 U. S. App. LEXIS 14262, at *22-51 (Sykes, J.,
dissenting).
117. Skoien, 2010 U. S. App. LEXIS 142662 at *31.
118. Id. MASS. CONST. OF 1780, art. XVII (“The people have a right to keep and bear arms for
the common defence.”); PA. CONST. OF 1776, art. XIII (“That the right of citizens to bear arms for
the defence of themselves and the State.”); N.C. CONST. OF 1776, art. XVII (“That the people have a
right to bear arms, for the defence of the State.”); VT. CONST. OF 1786, art. XVIII (“That the people
have a right to bear arms, for defence of themselves and the State.”).
119. See generally Charles, The Constitutional Significance of a “Well-Regulated Militia,”
supra note 15.
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1791, it is that a “well-regulated militia” was seen as superior to the right
to “bear arms” and the right to “keep arms” was non-existent in
“individual right” analogues. 120
Regarding a proper “historical guidepost” standard of review in
analyzing § 922(g)(9), the threshold judicial query is whether the
disarming of recidivist violent misdemeanants falls within the traditional
or historical “public injury” restrictions on firearms that would have
been publicly accepted at the time of the founding. The issue is not
finding an exact parallel to a 1791 restriction. It is whether it would
have been publicly accepted according to longstanding ideological and
philosophical constraints that the founders understood.
To begin, a court must work within the constraints of Heller and
take into account that the Supreme Court recognized that the “right to
keep and bear arms” is deeply rooted in our Anglo origins. 121 Assuming
the Heller majority’s historical interpretation as the true and correct
version given the constraints of judicial review, 122 the courts must work
within this framework and assume that, “By the time of the founding, the
right to have arms had become fundamental for English subjects.” 123 It
was a right that “unlike some other English rights . . . was codified in a
written Constitution.” 124
Logically, given that the founders borrowed their understanding of
the right to arms from their English ancestors, they would have also
borrowed and understood the permissible restrictions on the right,125
including the right to “keep arms.” This is significant because
Parliament and the crown possessed virtually unchecked authority to
disarm “dangerous and disaffected” persons as a means to preserve
public safety and government.126 This power remained unchecked and
unquestioned despite the recognition of the right of Protestants to “have
arms for their defence.” 127

120. In 1791, five state constitutions protected the right to a “well-regulated militia” compared
to four “bear arms” analogues. Furthermore, not one state “bear arms” analogue protected a right to
“keep arms” other than for the “common defence.” See infra notes 184-90 and accompanying text.
121. District of Columbia v. Heller, 128 S. Ct. 2783, 2798 (2008).
122. See supra notes 35-40 and accompanying text (discussing the legal restraints on litigating
history and that the “historical guidepost” approach requires working within those interpretative
restraints no matter whether that history corresponds with historical academia).
123. Heller, 128 S. Ct. at 2798.
124. Id. at 2801.
125. United States v. Marzzarella, No. 09-3185, 2010 U.S. App. LEXIS 15655, at *12-13 (3rd
Cir. July 29, 2010).
126. Charles, “Arms for Their Defence,”? supra note 15, at 356-403.
127. Id.; 1 W. & M. 2, c. 2 (1688) (Eng.).
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In fact, the seventeenth-century English print culture reveals the
importance of the common consent of the people, i.e., Parliament, in
determining who was “dangerous” and could be restricted from bearing
arms. John Sadler wrote that it was within parliamentary power to
determine “how, and when, and where it shall seem good” for
individuals to bear arms. 128 Sadler felt “all matters of History, telleth
us” the “general Custom was; Not to entrust any man with bearing Arms
. . . till some Common Council, more or less, had approved him.” 129
Similarly, in a 1658 tract entitled The Leveller, it stated that the power
over arming the people rested with Parliament because it is “prudent and
safe for the People to be masters of their own Arms, and to be
commanded in the use of them by a part of themselves, (that is their
Parliaments) whose interest is the same with theirs.” 130
This English history of the right to arms is significant for many
reasons under the “historical guidepost” approach. Perhaps most
importantly because the Heller majority recognized that the founding
fathers codified the English right into the Constitution as the Second
Amendment. 131 The difference between the English “have arms”
provision and the Second Amendment being that the latter is not
dependent on privileges of wealth or birth. Early constitutional
commentators were in agreement on this historical and legal fact. For
instance, St. George Tucker distinguished the two provisions, writing
that the difference is that “the right of bearing arms is confined to
protestants, and the words suitable to their condition and degree[.]” 132
Tucker would similarly write in his edition of Blackstone’s Commentaries
that the Second Amendment differed in that the “right of the people to
keep and bear arms” is “without any qualification as to their condition or
128. JOHN SADLER, RIGHTS OF THE KINGDOM, OR, CUSTOMS OF OUR ANCESTORS, TOUCHING
DUTY, POWER, ELECTION, OR SUCCESSION OF OUR KINGS AND PARLIAMENTS, OUR TRUE
LIBERTY, DUE ALLEGIANCE, THREE ESTATES, THEIR LEGISLATIVE POWER, ORIGINAL, JUDICIAL,
AND EXECUTIVE, WITH THE MILITIA, FREELY DISCUSSED THROUGH THE BRITISH, SAXON, NORMAN
LAWS AND HISTORIES, WITH AN OCCASIONAL DISCOURSE OF GREAT CHANGES YET EXPECTED IN
THE WORLD 159 (London, n. pub. 1682) (emphasis in original).
129. Id. (emphasis in original).
130. THE LEVELLER, OR, THE PRINCIPLES & MAXIMS CONCERNING GOVERNMENT AND
RELIGION, WHICH ARE ASSERTED BY THOSE THAT ARE COMMONLY CALLED, LEVELLERS 9
(London, n. pub. 1658).
131. District of Columbia v. Heller, 128 S. Ct. 2783, 2798, 2801 (2008); See also Marzzarella,
2010 U.S. App. LEXIS 15655, at *12-13.
132. ST. GEORGE TUCKER, A VIEW OF THE CONSTITUTION OF THE UNITED STATES WITH
SELECTED WRITINGS 239 (Clyde N. Wilson fwd., 1999). The phrase “suitable to their condition or
degree” was in reference to the fact that access to arms was based on socio-economic and hierarchal
status; what is known as the “chain-of-being.” See Charles, “Arms for Their Defence,”? supra note
15, at 358, 365, 378-80, 383, 385-86, 396, 398-99, 402, 403, 407.
THE
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degree, as is the case in the British government.” 133 William Rawle also
concluded that the “right to keep and bear arms” was “secured to
protestant subjects only, on the revolution of 1688; and it is cautiously
described to be that of bearing arms for their defence, ‘suitable to their
conditions and as allowed by law.’” 134
This evidence supports that the founding fathers understood and
accepted the English understanding of the right to “have arms” and its
constitutional limitations. This would have included understanding the
constitutionality of firearm restrictions on “dangerous and disaffected”
persons. While gun control laws circa 1791 do not draw an exact
parallel to the § 922(g)(9) disarming of recidivist violent
misdemeanants, the founding fathers understood the legal concept of the
law-abiding or virtuous citizen.135 Thus, the right to bear arms was
unequivocally connected to individuals being in support of just
government and its laws.
The Pennsylvania Minority proposal supports this understanding of
the right to arms, for they were willing to grant the federal government
great latitude in deciding who may “keep arms” and where such arms
may be “kept.” 136 Thus, in many respects the Pennsylvania Minority’s
right to “bear arms” resembled its English predecessor, where
Parliament gave the crown nearly unfettered discretion to disarm

133. 2 WILLIAM BLACKSTONE, BLACKSTONE’S COMMENTARIES: WITH NOTES OF REFERENCE
CONSTITUTION AND LAWS OF THE FEDERAL GOVERNMENT OF THE UNITED STATES AND OF
THE COMMONWEALTH OF VIRGINIA 143 n.40 (St. George Tucker ed., Philadelphia, Birch & Small
1803).
134. WILLIAM RAWLE, A VIEW OF THE CONSTITUTION OF THE UNITED STATES OF AMERICA
126 (2d ed. Philadelphia, Nicklin 1829).
135. See Saul Cornell & Nathan DeDino, A Well Regulated Right: The Early American Origins
of Gun Control, 73 FORDHAM L. REV. 487, 492 (2004); Robert E. Shalhope, The Armed Citizen in
the Early Republic, 49 LAW & CONTEMP. PROBS. 125, 130 (1986); Charles, The Constitutional
Significance of a “Well-Regulated Militia,” supra note 15, at 18-21, 46-47; MARTIN POST, AN
ORATION DELIVERED AT CORNWALL ON THE 5TH DAY OF JULY, A.D. 1802, FOR THE ANNIVERSARY
OF AMERICAN INDEPENDENCE 9 (1802) (“Virtue is the palladium of liberty and the bulwark of the
rights of the man.”); 2 ALEXANDER ADDISON, REPORTS OF CASES IN THE COUNTY COURTS OF THE
FIFTH CIRCUIT . . . OF THE STATE OF PENNSYLVANIA 150-51 (Philadelphia, Colerch & May 1800)
(“[V]irtue is the principle of a republican government” and to “produce public good, there must be
public virtue on the whole people; for in the hands of the whole people is the authority and force of
the nation really vested.”); THE GAZETTE OF THE UNITED STATES (Philadelphia, PA), Nov. 9, 1791,
at 221, col. 1 (“Let it then be the glory of every American to have arms in his hands, with some
knowledge how to use them, on proper occasions, against the enemies of his country: and let it be
established, as a point of honour, and the criterion of a virtuous citizen, to pay the greatest deference
to the common and necessary laws of a camp.”).
136. CHARLES, THE SECOND AMENDMENT, supra note 15, at 39-40. See also infra notes 196206 and accompanying text (discussing State Second Amendment analogues).
TO THE
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“disaffected and dangerous” persons. 137Furthermore, the fact that the
founding fathers exercised similar discretion when they disarmed
dangerous and disaffected persons throughout the American Revolution
supports that the founders would have publicly accepted the disarming
of recidivist violent misdemeanants who repeatedly show a disregard for
the laws of the community. 138
Certainly, drawing historical parallels between § 922(g)(9) and the
broad allowance granted to 1791 legislatures to disarm “dangerous and
disaffected” persons is not a perfect historical fit. However, finding an
exact historical parallel between a contemporary regulation and 1791 is a
rare occurrence. History seeks to provide the truth, leaving many
questions unanswered. The law works differently, but it must co-exist
with historical methodologies. It requires jurists to find answers to
issues, cases, and controversies based on the same historical evidence
that historians use. So long as jurists are honest and maintain a
“historical consciousness,” their use of “historical guideposts” does not
offend the Constitution.
In the constraints of the “historical guidepost” standard of review,
the use of “historical guideposts” does not require linking § 922(g)(9) to
a 1791 restriction to qualify as “publicly accepted.” The question the
courts have to ask is whether the founder’s understanding of the right to
arms would have accepted the restriction as necessary to prevent “public
injury.” As Justice Scalia wrote in his McDonald concurrence, the
historical method does not have to be the “perfect means . . . but whether
it is the best means available in an imperfect world.” 139 In other words,
the historical issue is whether under “any historical methodology, under
any plausible standard of proof, would lead to the same conclusion.” 140
To phrase it another way, the § 922(g)(9) question is whether there is a
longstanding ideological consensus circa 1791 for regulating or
restricting the “keeping” or “bearing” of arms of recidivist violent
misdemeanants that would have been accepted by the founding fathers.
Given the Founders’ emphasis on the law-abiding and virtuous citizen,
and that the legislatures were granted broad authority to disarm
“dangerous and disaffected” persons to prevent public injury, it is most
certain that such a restriction would be deemed constitutionally

137.
138.
37-38.
139.
140.

Charles, “Arms for Their Defence,”? supra note 15, at 356-403.
Charles, The Constitutional Significance of a “Well-Regulated Militia,” supra note 15, at
McDonald v. City of Chicago, 130 S. Ct. 3020, 3057-58 (2010) (emphasis in original).
Id. at 3058 (emphasis in original).
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permissible under the requisite low to intermediate scrutiny standard of
review.
III. THE MISSING ARGUMENTS IN MCDONALD V. CITY OF CHICAGO
Given McDonald was a divided plurality, for many years legal
commentators will speculate as to why five Justices were at odds in
joining one unified opinion. Naturally, Thomas’s concurrence reveals
that he interpreted the Fourteenth Amendment’s Privileges or
Immunities Clause as the historical impetus for incorporation.141
However, what is left unanswered is why Chief Justice Roberts, Justice
Scalia, and Justice Kennedy did not join Alito’s entire opinion.142 It
raises questions as to whether certain historical arguments would have
swayed a Justice to join the dissent and ultimately change the outcome
of the case.
While we will never affirmatively know the answer to these
questions, there is a lesson that lawyers, legal scholars, and historians
can take from the McDonald plurality; the importance of providing
cogent legal history arguments in litigating constitutional rights. In the
end, the professional historians that sided with the City of Chicago 143
were both losers and winners. They were “losers” in the sense that five
members of the Court embraced a historical interpretation of the Second
Amendment that is not supported by academia. 144 Meanwhile, they were
“winners” because the plurality embraced historical scholarship, albeit in
a “historical guidepost” approach, as the judicial means to define the
scope of the Second Amendment as its jurisprudence moves forward. 145
This begets the question: “What arguments could have been made
by the City of Chicago to alter the outcome of McDonald?” As will be
detailed below, two arguments stand out as missing. The first is an

141. Id. at 3058-88.
142. Id. at 3026-50.
143. See Brief for English/Early American Historians as Amici Curiae Supporting
Respondents, McDonald, 130 S. Ct. 3020 (2010) (No. 08-1521) (supported by twenty-one scholars
and historians); Brief for Thirty-Four Professional Historians and Legal Historians as Amici Curiae
Supporting Respondents, McDonald, 130 S. Ct. 3020 (2010) (No. 08-1521); Brief for Professional
Historians as Amici Curiae Supporting Respondents, McDonald, 130 S. Ct. 3020 (2010) (No. 081521) (supported by six scholars and historians); Brief of Historians on Early American Legal,
Constitutional and Pennsylvania History as Amici Curiae Supporting Respondents, McDonald, 130
S. Ct. 3020 (2010) (No. 08-1521) (supported by four historians).
144. As of today, only two academic Ph.D. historians (Joyce Lee Malcolm and Robert J.
Cottrol) support interpreting the Second Amendment in line with the Heller majority. The
overwhelming consensus by academic historians is to the contrary. See supra note 143.
145. See supra notes 15-16 and accompanying text.
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argument addressing the importance of State Second Amendment
analogues in determining whether the right to “keep arms” is
incorporated to the States through the Fourteenth Amendment’s Due
Process Clause. At no point did the City of Chicago or its amici provide
an analysis touching upon this issue; leaving Justice Alito to agree with
the petitioners, writing, “[F]our States that had adopted Second
Amendment analogues before ratification, nine more States adopted
state constitutional provisions protecting an individual right to keep and
bear arms between 1789 and 1820.” 146
Alito also had no competing analysis addressing Second
Amendment analogues circa 1868, leading him to believe:
In 1868, 22 of 37 States in the Union had state constitutional
provisions explicitly protecting the right to keep and bear arms . . .
[thus] it is clear that the Framers and ratifiers of the Fourteenth
Amendment counted the right to keep and bear arms among those
fundamental rights necessary to our system of ordered liberty. 147

The second argument that was missing was the use of accepted
historical methodologies to discuss John Bingham and the
Reconstruction Congress’s views on applying the Second Amendment to
the States. Scholars and historians are in general agreement that there
were members of the Reconstruction Congress that viewed the Second
Amendment as protecting armed, individual self-defense. However, the
historical evidence is not dispositive in determining the intent of the
whole Congress, for there is competing evidence that the majority may
have only sought to incorporate a right to “keep and bear arms” in the
constraints of a “well-regulated militia.” 148 In other words, because the
intent of the Reconstruction Congress as a whole is an issue of historical
uncertainty and discontent, an argument should have been posed that the
decision in Presser v. Illinois should be upheld as the intent of the
Reconstruction Congress. 149

147. McDonald, 130 S. Ct. at 3042. By 1868, only seventeen state constitution “bear arms”
provisions could be read to protect the right recognized in Heller. Naturally, this is looking at the
provision in a light most favorable to the “individual right” stance. However, out of these seventeen
“bear arms” provisions, eleven could just as easily be interpreted as protecting only a militia right.
Charles, “Arms for Their Defence,”? supra note 15, at 459 n.740.
148. Id. at 456-60.
149. Presser v. Illinois, 116 U.S. 252, 265 (1886) (the Second Amendment prevents the states
from “prohibit[ing] the people from keeping and bear arms, so as to deprive the United States of
their rightful resource for maintaining the public security”). A brief written by Lyman Trumbull
gives weight to this understanding of the Second Amendment. Representing one of the plaintiffs in
error, Trumbull advocated for “the right of the people to keep and bear arms for the purpose of
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A. The “Right to Keep and Bear Arms” in State Constitutions in 1789,
1803, and 1868: Correcting Justice Alito’s Analysis in McDonald v. City
of Chicago
The powers to arm, disarm, and regulate the use, possession, and
maintaining of firearms had always been a power that resided with the
States. This power existed prior to the adoption of the Articles of
Confederation, prior to the adoption of the Constitution, 150 after the
adoption of the Constitution, 151 and had never been questioned by the
Supreme Court in the first two hundred and twenty years of existence.

forming a well regulated militia . . . [as] an attribute of national citizenship, and as such, under the
protection of, and guaranteed by the United States.” Trumbull also wrote, “The citizen of the
United States has secured to him the right to keep and bear arms as part of the militia which
Congress has the right to organize, and arm, and drill into companies.” Whether Trumbull believed
in a non-militia “right to keep and bear arms” is less certain. He thought the Court should not
consider the question of whether “a State may not prohibit its citizens from keeping or bearing arms
for other than militia purposes[.]”
150. For history of regulations and power to disarm, see generally Cornell, supra note 15;
SAUL CORNELL, A WELL-REGULATED MILITIA: THE FOUNDING FATHERS AND THE ORIGINS OF
GUN CONTROL IN AMERICA (2006); Robert H. Churchill, Gun Regulation, the Police Power, and the
Right to Keep Arms in Early America, 25 LAW & HIST. REV. 139 (2007). See also CHARLES, THE
SECOND AMENDMENT, supra note 15, at 17-34, 83-87, 136-39; Charles, The Constitutional
Significance of a “Well-Regulated Militia,” supra note 15, at 37-38 (discussing how the Continental
Congress advised the States to pass laws disarming the disaffected); Charles, “Arms for Their
Defence,”? supra note 15, at 386-418 (addressing the English laws concerning arms, which the
founding fathers were familiar with); Lois G. Schwoerer, To Hold and Bear Arms: The English
Perspective, in THE SECOND AMENDMENT IN LAW AND HISTORY: HISTORIANS AND
CONSTITUTIONAL SCHOLARS ON THE RIGHT TO BEAR ARMS 207, 207–21 (Carl T. Bogus ed., 2000).
151. The early constitutional commentators differed of opinion as to whether the Second
Amendment bound the States. It seems that James Wilson was the first to claim the States were
bound by its guarantee. However, he limited its protection to the advancement of the “common
defence.” 2 JAMES WILSON, THE COLLECTED WORKS OF JAMES WILSON 1141–42 (Kermit L. Hall
& Mark David Hall eds., 2007).In 1829, William Rawle was the second to claim the Second
Amendment bound the States as well as the federal governing, writing:
The prohibition is general. No clause in the Constitution could by any rule of
construction be conceived to give to congress a power to disarm the people. Such a
flagitious attempt could only be made under some general pretence by a state legislature.
But if in any blind pursuit of inordinate power, either should attempt it, this amendment
may be appealed as a restraint on both.
RAWLE, supra note 134, at 125-26. Many Individual Right Scholars have interpreted this statement
as preventing the States and federal government from disarming the people outside of a “wellregulated militia.” See Don B. Kates, Handgun Prohibition and the Original Meaning of the
Second Amendment, 82 MICH. L. REV. 204 (1983); Joyce Lee Malcolm, Arming America, 79 TEX. L.
REV. 1657, 1675 (2001) (book review); Clayton E. Cramer & Joseph E. Olson, What Did “Bear
Arms” Mean in the Second Amendment?, 6 GEO. J. L. & PUB. POL’Y 511, 519-20 (2008).However,
this interpretation cannot survive because Rawle qualifies the right was “judiciously added” because
“a disorderly militia is disgraceful to itself, and dangerous not to the enemy, but to its own country.”
RAWLE, supra note 134, at 125. See also generally Charles, The Constitutional Significance of a
“Well-Regulated Militia,” supra note 15.
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State police powers in this area were particularly understood at the time
of the framing of the Constitution. A fact that James Wilson took note
of in one of his William & Mary lectures. Wilson differentiated between
the rights the Second Amendment and the Pennsylvania Constitution
afford, writing that the Second Amendment protects citizens in
participating in the “common defence.”152 Meanwhile, it was through
the medium of the Pennsylvania Constitution that Wilson viewed
citizens as having the privilege of bearing arms in defense of their
“person or house.” 153
Despite the Heller majority writing that “self-defense” was the
“central component” of the Second Amendment, 154 there is virtually no
substantiated evidence that the Framers intended for the Second
Amendment to bind the States outside of its “well-regulated militia”
context. Similar to James Wilson, other contemporaneous commentary
on the Second Amendment reveals that it was only meant to bind the
States as preserving the “common defence.” For instance, on October
25, 1790, militia Lieutenant Bernard Hubley hoped that a “well
Regulated militia corresponding with the Constitution” would be
“adopted” throughout the nation to ensure “the best end.” 155 A 1789
letter from Fayetteville, North Carolina recognized that the “best
security” of the right to “keep and bear arms” was “that military spirit,
that taste for the martial exercise, which has always distinguished the
free citizens of these States.” 156 In 1801, Samuel Dana described the
Second Amendment as being “recognized among our unalterable laws”
and protecting the “right of bearing arms for the common defence[.]” 157
Meanwhile Anti-Federalist John Taylor described the Second
Amendment as enshrining “a real national militia.”158
Again, prior to Heller, Supreme Court precedent supported this
limited application of the Second Amendment to the States. In Presser

152. WILSON, supra note 151, at 1141–42.
153. Id. at 1142.
154. District of Columbia v. Heller, 128 S. Ct. 2783, 2801 (2008). The Heller majority was
correct that “self-defense” or “self-preservation” was the right the Second Amendment affords.
However, they took these terms out of their original context by misreading the 1689 Declaration of
Rights. See generally, supra note 15; see Charles, The Right of Self-Preservation and Resistance,
supra note 15.
155. 11 PENNSYLVANIA ARCHIVES 738 (Samuel Hazard ed., Philadelphia, Joseph Severns &
Co. 1855).
156. THE GAZETTE OF THE UNITED STATES (Philadelphia, PA), Oct. 14, 1789, at 3, col. 2.
157. SAMUEL DANA, AN ADDRESS ON THE IMPORTANCE OF A WELL REGULATED MILITIA 10
(Charleston, Samuel Etheridge, September 1801).
158. JOHN TAYLOR, AN INQUIRY INTO THE PRINCIPLES AND POLICY OF GOVERNMENT 450 (n.
pub. 1814).
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v. Illinois, the Court held that the Second Amendment prevents the
States from “prohibiting the people from keeping and bearing arms, so
as to deprive the United States of their rightful resource for maintaining
the public security[.]” 159 Meanwhile, in United States v. Schwimmer, the
Court held that the use of arms “to defend our government against all
enemies whether necessity arises is a fundamental principle of the
Constitution.” 160 Herein lies the protection the Second Amendment was
meant to apply to the States—United States citizens have the right to
take part in defending their liberties through a “well-regulated militia.”
Naturally, the McDonald plurality disagreed, but this can be
partially attributed to the lack of a comprehensive analysis emphasizing
the right to “keep arms” through State Second Amendment analogues. 161
Not one of the briefs in support of the City of Chicago distinguished the
different State Second Amendment analogues and their importance or
applicability to incorporating the right to “keep arms. For instance,
looking at the state provisions as codified circa 1789, Justice Alito writes
that “four States . . . adopted Second Amendment analogues before
ratification” that protected “an individual right to keep and bear
arms[.]” 162 Alito’s characterization of 1789 is flat wrong in two
respects. First, only two states’ “bear arms” provisions could be read to
protect a right to armed, individual self-defense of a person. 163 Second,
only one state’s “bear arms” provision protects the right to “keep
arms.” 164
Alito was correct that four state constitutions contained Second
Amendment analogues, including Massachusetts,165 Pennsylvania, 166

159. Presser v. Illinois, 116 U.S. 252, 265 (1886).
160. United States v. Schwimmer, 279 U.S 644, 650 (1929).
161. McDonald v. City of Chicago, 130 S. Ct. 3020, 3109 (2010). (Stevens, J., dissenting)
(characterizing the legal issue as “Petitioners wish to acquire certain types of firearms, or to keep
certain possession of chattels”).
162. Id. at 3037. Justice Alito cites the Heller opinion to support this conclusion. However,
the Heller majority’s understanding of these earlier constitutional provisions had been refuted. See
CHARLES, THE SECOND AMENDMENT, supra note 15, at 131-32.
163. PA. CONST. OF 1776, art. XIII (“That the right of citizens to bear arms for the defence of
themselves and the State.”); VT. CONST. OF 1786, art. XVIII (“That the people have a right to bear
arms, for defence of themselves and the State.”). The Supreme Court did not provide individual
analysis on these provisions, which could be interpreted as protecting the limited militia right. See
CHARLES, THE SECOND AMENDMENT, supra note 15, at 131-32; Charles, The Right of SelfPreservation and Resistance, supra note 15, at 29 (discussing that “defence of themselves” was
often used to describe defending the realm or restoring the Constitution).
164. MASS. CONST. OF 1780, art. XVII (“The people have a right to keep and bear arms for the
common defence.”).
165. Id.

CHARLES_MACROED_FINAL_EDITOR.DOCX

44

2/7/20112:57 PM

AKRON JOURNAL OF CONSTITUTIONAL LAW AND POLICY

North Carolina, 167 and Vermont. 168
However, only the 1780
Massachusetts Constitution protected a right to “keep arms” which was
This limited
expressly limited to the “common defence.”169
interpretation of the Massachusetts protection was confirmed in the
wake of Shays’ Rebellion. The Massachusetts Legislature and Governor
James Bowdoin clarified that the “right to keep and bear arms” was
included in the Massachusetts Constitution because it was “necessary for
the safety of the state” in order “to support the civil government and
oppose attempts of factitious and wicked men who may wish to subvert
the laws and constitution of their country.” 170
At no point was there a reference to the right protecting the
“keeping” of arms for any and all purposes, including armed, individual
self-defense. In fact, the Shays’ insurgents that refused to submit to the
Massachusetts government had their arms seized with no mention of a
right to arms being violated by them, any of the prominent founders, or
the contemporaneous popular print culture. 171 While one may argue that
participating in armed rebellion would clearly warrant disarmament,
even at the founding period, this does not explain why much to do was
made of the fact that the insurgents were being denied the right to vote.
For instance, George Washington and Benjamin Lincoln could not see
“how, upon republican principles . . . can we justly exclude them from
the right of Governing.” 172 Meanwhile James Madison was of the
opinion that such political exclusion brought on a “new crisis” because it
“disenfranchised a considerable portion of disaffected voters.”173
Indeed, this raises a very important question: “Was the right to vote
and participate in government viewed as superior to the right to “keep
and bear arms for the common defence”?” The answer is no. Both the
right to “keep and bear arms” and a right to vote were codified in the

166. PA. CONST. OF 1776, art. XIII (“That the right of citizens to bear arms for the defence of
themselves and the State”).
167. N.C. CONST. OF 1776, art. XVII (“That the people have a right to bear arms, for the
defence of the State.”).
168. VT. CONST. OF 1786, art. XVIII (“That the people have a right to bear arms, for defence of
themselves and the State.”).
169. MASS. CONST. OF 1780, art. XVII.
170. AN ACT FOR THE MORE SPEEDY AND EFFECTUAL SUPPRESSION OF TUMULTS AND
INSURRECTIONS IN THE COMMONWEALTH (Mass. 1787).
171. CHARLES, THE SECOND AMENDMENT, supra note 15, at 84-87.
172. 4 THE PAPERS OF GEORGE WASHINGTON: CONFEDERATION SERIES 433 (Philander D.
Chase ed., 1995).
173. 9 THE PAPERS OF JAMES MADISON 286, 307 (Gaillard Hunt ed., 1975). See also id. at 315,
343, 395-96, 399.
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1780 Massachusetts Constitution. 174 The only difference between the
two provisions is that the right to “keep and bear arms” was expressly
limited to the “common defence.” This limited interpretation of the right
to “keep arms” is supported by the use of the phrase in contemporaneous
militia laws and military treatises. 175 Commentators seem to forget that
the Heller majority held that “keep arms” was a phrase that was “not
prevalent in the written documents of the founding period that we have
found.” 176
In other words, the Heller majority did not examine the phrase in
contemporaneous laws and literature. This interpretational farce could
have been significant in McDonald because the City of Chicago and its
amici could have more thoroughly177 illuminated that the phrase was
consistently used in state laws to describe the maintaining of military
arms for militia service. For instance, in Delaware’s 1782 Militia Act it
required every enrolled militiaman to “keep the [same] arms by him at
all times, ready and fit for Service” or pay a fine of twenty shillings. 178
In Maryland’s 1799 Militia Act it restricted the “keeping” of arms when
it provided if “any private or non commissioned officer, to whom a
musket is delivered, shall use the same in hunting, gunning or fowling or
shall not keep his arms . . . in neat and clean order . . . shall forfeit” a
fine. 179 Meanwhile, Virginia’s 1784 militia law required the slave
patrols to “constantly keep the aforesaid arms, accoutrements, and
ammunition ready.” 180
Furthermore, the fact that the right to “keep arms” circa 1789 only
appears in the 1780 Massachusetts Constitution for the “common
defence” illuminates the argument that the States have always had a
compelling interest in determining who owns or possesses arms, outside
the “well-regulated militia” context, in the interest of public safety, and
therefore the Heller right should not have been applied to the States.
This interpretation is even supported by the history of the 1792 National

174. See MASS. CONST. OF 1780, CHAP. I, § 2, art. II.
175. CHARLES, THE SECOND AMENDMENT, supra note 15, at 22-30.
176. District of Columbia v. Heller, 128 S. Ct. 2783, 2792 (2008).
177. To my knowledge only the English Historians’ brief addressed this fact. See Brief for
English/Early American Historians as Amici Curiae Supporting Respondents, supra note 143, at 3839.
178. AN ACT FOR ESTABLISHING A MILITIA WITHIN THIS STATE, § 6 (Del. 1782).
179. A SUPPLEMENT TO THE ACT ENTITLED, ‘AN ACT TO REGULATE AND DISCIPLINE THE
MILITIA OF THIS STATE, § 30 (Md. 1799).
180. 11 STATUTES AT LARGE OF VIRGINIA 478-79 (William Hening ed., Richmond, George
Cochran 1823).
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Militia Act. 181 Congress intentionally left to the States the authority to
enforce the Act’s arming provisions, 182 which reveals that the federal
government had no intention of impeding the States’ authority to
regulate the “keeping” or maintaining of arms. 183
Lastly, the fact that five state constitutions (compared to only four
“bear arms” provisions) protected a right to a “well-regulated militia” 184
could have been used to support this argument—i.e., that the right to
“keep arms” should only apply to the States in the limited context
recognized in Presser and Schwimmer. As addressed above, Justice
Alito claimed that four states circa 1789 “adopted Second Amendment
analogues” protecting the Heller right, 185 but a general reading does not
support that either the Massachusetts or North Carolina constitutions
protected such a right. 186 Certainly, Pennsylvania and Vermont’s
constitutional guarantees could be read in a light that supports Heller. 187
However, these guarantees make no mention of a right to “keep arms.”
Thus, there is a strong constitutional presumption that the founding
fathers viewed individualized arms ownership as akin to the
Pennsylvania Minority dissent, which permitted the disarming of people
“for crimes committed” or when the legislatures thought there would be
a “real danger of public injury from individuals[.]” 188

181. 1 U.S. STAT. 271 (1792).
182. For a history, see CHARLES, THE SECOND AMENDMENT, supra note 15, at 71-79, 139-53.
183. Id. at 139-53. This includes the state keeping the arms and only distributing them during
times of muster. Id. at 31-34. This practice was consistent with their English forefathers, see 4 & 5
Phil. & Mary. c. 2, § 5 (1557-8) (Eng.) (the arms of cities, boroughs, towns, parishes, and hamlets
shall “be kepte in suche Place as by the sayd Commissioners shalbe appointed”); 30 Geo. 2, c. 25
(1757) (Eng.).
184. MD. CONST. of 1776 art. XXV (“That a well-regulated militia is the proper and natural
defence of a free government.”); N.H. CONST. of 1784 art. XXIV (“A well regulated militia is the
proper, natural, and sure defence of a state.”); DECLARATION OF RIGHTS AND FUNDAMENTAL
RULES art. XVIII (Del. 1776) (“That a well regulated Militia is the proper, natural and safe Defense
of a free government.”); DECLARATION OF RIGHTS art. XIII (Va. 1776) (“That a well regulated
militia, composed of the body of people trained to arms, is the proper, natural, and safe defence of a
free State.”); N.Y. CONST. of 1777, art. XL (“And whereas it is of the utmost importance to the
safety of every State that it should always be in a condition of defence; and it is the duty of every
man who enjoys the protection of society to be prepared and willing to defend it; this convention
therefore, in the name and by the authority of the good people of this State, doth ordain, determine,
and declare that the militia of this State, at all times hereafter, as well in peace as in war, shall be
armed and disciplined, and in readiness for service.”).
185. McDonald v. City of Chicago, 130 S. Ct. 3020, 3037 (2010).
186. See supra note 167, 169 and accompanying text.
187. See supra note 166, 168.
188. THE ADDRESS AND REASONS OF DISSENT OF THE MINORITY OF THE CONVENTION OF THE
STATE OF PENNSYLVANIA, TO THEIR CONSTITUENTS (Dec. 17, 1787).

CHARLES_MACROED_FINAL_EDITOR.DOCX

2010]

THE SECOND AMENDMENT STANDARD OF REVIEW AFTER MCDONALD

2/7/20112:57 PM

47

This status quo did not change with the addition of the States of
Kentucky, Tennessee, and Ohio. All three constitutions would include a
“bear arms” provision, 189 but only the Tennessee Constitution included a
right to “keep arms.” Similar to Massachusetts, this right only extended
to the keeping and bearing of arms for the “common defence.” Thus, by
1803, out of seventeen State constitutions the Second Amendment
analogues could be categorized as follows in Chart I (“State Second
Amendment Analogues Circa 1803”). 190
Of course, Justice Alito did not distinguish the Second Amendment
analogues in this fashion because it was never brought to the Court’s
attention. Instead, Alito reiterated the Heller majority’s classification of
armed, individual self-defense in the home as the “palladium of
liberty” 191—a characterization that does not comport with the founders’
understanding of the Second Amendment. 192 “Arms” by themselves
were not the “palladium of liberty” to which St. George Tucker and
Joseph Story referred. 193 It was the Second Amendment’s “well
regulated militia” that the founding generation repetitively described as
the “palladium of liberty,” for it encompassed an ancient constitutional

189. OHIO CONST. of 1802 art. VIII, § 20 (“That the people have a right to bear arms for the
defense of themselves and the state: and as standing armies in time of peace, are dangerous to
liberty, they shall not be kept up; and that the military shall be kept under strict subordination to the
civil power.”); KY. CONST. of 1799 art. X, § 23 (“That the rights of the citizens to bear arms in
defence of themselves and the State shall not be questioned.”); TENN. CONST. of 1796 art. XI, § 26
(“That the freemen of this State have a right to keep and bear arms for their common defence.”).
190. This is interpreting the respective state constitutions in a light most favorable to the right
recognized in Heller. However, there is sufficient evidence available to interpret these provisions as
being limited to a militia right. See CHARLES, THE SECOND AMENDMENT, supra note 15, at 132-34.
Even if one takes the State Second Amendment analogues circa 1820, only Mississippi’s protects a
right to “keep arms” for personal self-defense. MISS. CONST. of 1817 art. I, § 23 (“The right of
every citizen to keep and bear arms in defense of his home, person, or property, or in the aid of the
civil power when thereto legally summoned, shall not be called into question, but the legislature
may regulate or forbid the carrying of concealed weapons.”). Indiana and Alabama’s analogues
were limited to “bear arms.” IND. CONST. of 1816 art. I, § 20 (“That the people have a right to bear
arms for the defence of themselves and the state.”); ALA. CONST. of 1819 art. I, § 23 (“Every citizen
has a right to bear arms in defence of himself and the State.”). Louisiana’s analogue only protected
a militia right. LA. CONST. of 1812 art.III, § 22 (“The free white men of this State, shall be armed
and disciplined for its defence”). The Illinois Constitution circa 1820 did not contain a Second
Amendment analogue.
191. District of Columbia v. Heller, 128 S. Ct. 2783, 2805 (2008).
192. See Charles, “Arms for Their Defence,”? supra note 15, at 420-21; CHARLES, THE
SECOND AMENDMENT, supra note 15, at 50. See also generally Saul Cornell, St. George Tucker
and the Second Amendment: Original Understandings and Modern Misunderstandings, 47 WM. &
MARY L. REV. 1123 (2006).
193. See TUCKER, supra note 132, at 238; JOSEPH STORY, COMMENTARIES ON THE
CONSTITUTION OF THE UNITED STATES § 1001 ((Boston, C.C. Little & J. Brown 1833).
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balance consistent with the republican ideals of the Roman, Florentine,
and the English Constitutions. 194
This understanding of a “well-regulated militia” as the “palladium
of liberty” was frequently conveyed in the popular print culture. For
example, a July 1789 edition of The New-York Packet discussed how a
“well regulated Militia” requires the “habitual exercise” of military
training and “manly discipline, which is the bulwark of the country[.]”195
This knowledge of the military art was the “sole means to render a
standing army useless” and to “form a truly warlike militia.”196 It was
not “arms” in itself that secured the nation. It was the maintenance of
knowledge in the military art, for “education is a bulwark against
tyranny, it is the grand palladium of true liberty in a republican
government.” 197 James Simmons similarly described the “militia of
America” as the “palladium of our security, and the first effectual resort
in case of hostility.” 198 Isaac Crane wrote that the national assemblage
of the militia was the “grand palladium of our liberties[.]” 199
Meanwhile, a 1798 militia address published in the Connecticut Gazette
stated, “The importance and practicability of a well regulated and
disciplined Militia, in a free country, cannot be doubted, this day you
have evinced that such a thing is altogether practicable—You are the
palladium of which your country leans for the protection against all
foreign invasion[.]” 200
Therefore, given that there were (a) more “well-regulated militia”
analogues than Heller right analogues, (b) not one Heller right analogue
protected a right to “keep arms,” and that (c) St. George Tucker and
Joseph Story were referring to the militia as a “palladium of liberty,” it
makes little sense for Alito to claim that the Second Amendment
analogues protected “an individual right to keep and bear arms” that
“legal commentators confirmed the importance of[.]” 201 If anything, the
Second Amendment analogues contemporaneous with the Constitution
reveal that the States had varying views on the right to “bear arms,” with
the majority supporting a right to a “well-regulated militia,” to “bear

194. Charles, The Constitutional Significance of a “Well-Regulated Militia,” supra note 15, at
12-13, 21-22, 52-53.
195. THE NEW-YORK PACKET (New York, NY), July 25, 1789, at 2 col. 4.
196. Id. at 3, col. 1.
197. Id.
198. JAMES SIMMONS, A MILITARY ESSAY 12 (Charleston, Markland & M’lver 1793).
199. ISAAC WATTS CRANE, AN ORATION DELIVERED AT THE PRESBYTERIAN CHURCH, AT
ELIZABETH-TOWN, ON THE FOURTH OF JULY, 1794, at 15 (Newark, Woods 1795).
200. AMERICAN MERCURY (Hartford, CT), Nov. 1, 1798, pg. 2 col. 3.
201. McDonald v. City of Chicago, 130 S. Ct. 3020, 3037 (2010).
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arms” for the “common defence” of the State, and the right to “keep
arms” outside of this context was a matter of state control.
This still leaves the state constitutions as codified at the time of the
Fourteenth Amendment’s ratification. Justice Alito writes, “22 of 37
States in the Union had state constitutional provisions explicitly
protecting the right to keep and bear arms,” making it “clear that the
Framers and ratifiers of the Fourteenth Amendment counted the right to
keep and bear arms among those fundamental rights necessary to our
system of ordered liberty.” 202 Here again, Alito’s statement needs to be
qualified because the evidence is not as clear and convincing as he was
led to believe in an amicus brief submitted by thirty-seven State
Attorneys General. 203
As shown in Chart II (“State Second Amendment Analogues Circa
1868”) only seventeen state analogues can be interpreted to protect the
right recognized in Heller; 204 less than half of the State constitutions
circa 1868. Most importantly, out of these seventeen Heller right
analogues only five protected a right to “keep arms” – the legal question
at issue in

202. Id. at 3042.
203. See Brief for Texas and Thirty-Seven Other States as Amici Curiae Supporting
Petitioners, at 15-16, McDonald, 130 S. Ct 3020 (2010) (No. 08-1521).
204. ALA. CONST. of 1867 art. I, § 28; CONN. CONST. of 1818 art. I, § 17; FLA. CONST. of 1868
art. I, § 22; GA. CONST. of 1868 art. I, § 14; IND. CONST. of 1851 art. I, § 32; KAN. CONST. of 1859,
BILL OF RIGHTS, § 4; KY. CONST. of 1850 art. XIII, § 25; MICH. CONST. of 1850 art. XVIII, § 7;
MISS. CONST. of 1868 art. I, § 15; MO. CONST. of 1865 art. I, § 8; N.C. CONST. of 1868 art. I, § 24;
OHIO CONST. of 1851 art. I, § 4; OR. CONST. of 1857 art. I, § 27; PA. CONST. of 1838 art. IX, § 21;
R.I. CONST. of 1842 art I, § 22; TEX. CONST. of 1868 art. I, § 13; VT. CONST. of 1793 ch. I, art.
XVI. This is looking at each state’s constitution in a light most favorable to the “individual right”
stance. However, out of these seventeen states, arguably eleven of these “bear arms” provisions
could be interpreted as merely a militia right. See CHARLES, THE SECOND AMENDMENT, supra note
15, at 132-34 (discussing how the Courts should determine whether a state provision is a militia or
individual self-defense right); FLA. CONST. of 1868 art. I, § 22 (“[R]ight to bear arms in defence of
themselves and the lawful authority of the State.”); GA. CONST. of 1868 art. I, § 14 (“[R]ight of the
people to keep and bear arms shall not be infringed.”); IND. CONST. of 1851 art. I, § 32 (“[R]ight to
bear arms for the defence of themselves and the State.”); § 4; KY. CONST. of 1850 art. XIII, § 25
(“[R]ight of the citizens to bear arms in defence of themselves and the State shall not be
questioned.”); MO. CONST. of 1865 art. I, § 8 (“[R]ight to bear arms in defence of themselves and of
the lawful authority of the State cannot be questioned.”); N.C. CONST. of 1868 art. I, § 24 (“[R]ight
of the people to keep and bear arms shall not be infringed.”); OHIO CONST. of 1851 art. I, § 4
(“[P]eople have the right to bear arms for their defense and security.”); OR. CONST. of 1857 art. I, §
27 (“[P]eople shall have the right to bear arms for the defence of themselves and the State.”); PA.
CONST. of 1838 art. IX, § 21 (“[R]ight of the citizens to bear arms, in defence of themselves and the
State, shall not be questioned.”); R.I. CONST. of 1842 art. I, § 22 (“[R]ight of the people to keep and
bear arms shall not be infringed.”); VT. CONST. of 1793 ch. I, art. XVI. (“[P]eople have a right to
bear arms for the defence of themselves and the State.”).
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McDonald. 205 At the same time, however, five state constitutions
expressly limited the “right to keep and bear arms” to the “common
defence.” 206
It is nonsensical to incorporate a right to “keep arms” for armed self
defense of the home and classify it as “fundamental to a scheme of
ordered liberty” when only five State analogues circa 1868 protected
such a right. If anything, the fact that five State analogues limited the
right to “keep arms” for the “common defence,” coupled with the fact
that a total of thirty-two States did not protect a right to “keep arms” for
personal self-defense presents a strong constitutional presumption that
that the “keeping” of arms is a power reserved to the States.
Despite the availability of these state analogue statistics, no one
sought to analyze them to counter the claims of gun right advocates’,
Individual Right Scholars’, and the McDonald petitioners’ improper
equation of a right to “keep arms” with other fundamental rights circa
1868. As seen in comparing Chart II to Chart III (“State Constitutional
Analogues Circa 1868”), a right to “keep arms” for personal self-defense
was in no way equal to other fundamental rights of the era such as
freedom of speech and religion, due process, right to a fair jury trial for
alleged crimes committed, double jeopardy, cruel and unusual
punishment, and unlawful searches and seizures. Excluding double
jeopardy (eighty-third percentile), these fundamental rights are within
the eighty-sixth percentile. Furthermore, the fact that unincorporated
rights such as the quartering of troops, excessive bail, and the grand jury
clause substantially exceed the right to “keep arms,” the Heller decision
does not favor incorporation. Even taking Alito’s characterization of the
Second Amendment analogues as true, the “right to keep and bear arms”
circa 1868 falls within the realm of the unincorporated rights of

205. GA. CONST. of 1868 art. I, § 14 (“A well-regulated militia being necessary to the security
of a free people, the right of the people to keep and bear arms shall not be infringed.”); MISS.
CONST. of 1868 art. I, § 15 (“All persons shall have a right to keep and bear arms for their
defence.”); N.C. CONST. of 1868 art. I, § 24 (“A well-regulated militia being necessary to the
security of a free State, the right of the people to keep and bear arms shall not be infringed.”); R.I.
CONST. of 1842 art. I, § 22 (“The right of the people to keep and bear arms shall not be infringed.”);
TEX. CONST. of 1868 art. I, § 13 (“Every person shall have the right to keep and bear arms, in the
lawful defence of himself or the State.”).
206. ARK. CONST. of 1868 art. I, § 5 (“The citizens of this State shall have the right to keep and
bear arms for their common defence.”); ME. CONST. of 1820 art. I, § 16 (“Every citizen has the right
to keep and bear arms for their common defence.”); MASS. CONST. of 1780 art. XVII (“The people
have a right to keep and bear arms for the common defence.”); S.C. CONST. of 1868 art. I, § 28
(“The people have a right to keep and bear arms for the common defence.”); TENN. CONST. of 1834
art. I, § 26 (“That the free white men of this State have a right to Keep and to bear arms for their
common defence.”).
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Unlawful Seizure

Due Process

Cruel and Unusual Punishment

Trial By Jury
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Unincorporated Rights
X

X
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X

X

X

X

X

X

X

X

X

X

X

X

X
X

X

X

X

X

X

X

X

X

X

X

X

X

X

X

X

X

X

X

X

X

X

X

X

X

X

X

X

X

X

X

X

X

X

X

X

X

X

X

Texas (1868)

X

X

X

X

X

X

X

Vermont (1793)

X

X

X

X

X

X

Virginia (1864)

X

X

X

West Virginia (1863)

X

X

X

Wisconsin (1848)

X

X

Totals

37

37

100.00%

100.00%

Percentile

32
86.50%

X

X

X

X

X

X

X

X

X

X

X

36

36

31

36

20

97.30%

97.30%

83.80%

24
64.90%

97.30%

54.10%
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quartering troops and grand jury clause (fifty-ninth percentile). Perhaps
what is most striking is that the Heller right analogues fall significantly
short of all unincorporated rights at less than half of all State
constitutions circa 1868 (forty-fifth percentile)—a fact that makes it hard
to classify the Heller right as fundamental to an ordered scheme of
liberty.
To paraphrase, a detailed analysis of the Second Amendment
analogues circa 1789, 1803, and 1868 may have prevented incorporation
in McDonald because what constituted the “right to keep and bear arms”
substantially varied throughout the United States. Of particular
importance is that the right to “keep arms” for individual purposes was
nonexistent in 1789 state constitutions, and in only five of thirty-seven
state constitutions circa 1868. Even under a “living constitution”
argument, the Second Amendment analogue argument fails, for only
twenty-eight of fifty states have “keep arms” analogues that can be
interpreted as protecting individual self-defense—a measly 56% of all
state constitutions. 207 Thus, there is a strong argument that the right to
“keep arms” should be viewed as unique and distinct from the other
protections in the Bill of Rights. It was a right that has always affected
the safety of the whole community, and has been viewed as intimately
connected with the police power of the State.208
Despite McDonald incorporating the Second Amendment to the
States, perhaps this evidence can still be useful in future courts
examining the constitutionality of gun control laws. The evidence is
clear and convincing that the States have always had a compelling
interest in regulating the “keeping” of arms to protect the community.
The absence of “keep arms” in “individual right” Second Amendment
analogues circa 1789 and 1803, coupled with their limited use in 1868
constitutions (5 of 37 States), drives this point home. Thus, should the
courts ever decide to give greater deference to the States regulating the
“keeping” of arms than that of “bearing” arms,” it would comport with
the historical guidepost approach, for such regulations would fall within
traditional norms.

207. This count in based on a compilation of state “bear arms” analogues by Eugene Volokh.
See Eugene Volokh, State Constitutional Right to Keep and Bear Arms Provisions, 11 TEX. REV. L.
& POL. 191 (2006).
208. RAWLE, supra note134, at 125 (an armed nation is “dangerous not to the enemy, but to its
own country”).
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John Bingham’s Second Amendment?: Competing History and
Reexamining the “Privilege” to “Bear Arms” and Incorporation
Through the Fourteenth Amendment’s Privileges or Immunities
Clause

In a concurring opinion Justice Thomas described the process of
selective incorporation as a “legal fiction” and a “dangerous one” at
that. 209 Instead of focusing on whether a right was essential to the
American “scheme of ordered liberty” or “deeply rooted in this Nation’s
history and tradition,” Thomas felt incorporation should be reexamined
under the Fourteenth Amendment’s Privileges or Immunities Clause
“consistent with public understanding at the time of its ratification.” 210
In a way, Thomas’s concurrence was the opinion that the City of
Chicago did not attempt to sway by providing the competing concerns of
the Fourteenth Amendment’s ratifiers. It was well known that Thomas
had expressed a desire to reexamine the history of the Privileges or
Immunities Clause should the appropriate case arise.211 Perhaps if the
City of Chicago had brought forth an argument using accepted historical
methodologies to show the competing evidence, Justice Stevens’
concerns—touching upon the use of history to define incorporation of
rights to the States—would have been given more weight. Stevens
queried:
Under the “historically focused” approach . . . numerous threshold
questions arise before one ever gets to the history. At what level of
generality should one frame the liberty interest in question? What does
it mean for a right to be “deeply rooted in this Nation’s history and
tradition”? By what standards will that proposition be tested? Which
types of sources will count, and how will those sources be weighed and
aggregated? . . . It is hardly a novel insight that history is not an
objective science, and that its use can therefore “point in any direction
the judges favor.” 212

To paraphrase, Stevens was arguing that history alone should not
sway the Court’s determination, for it can produce competing results.
This holds especially true when trying to calculate the “public” or
“popular understanding” of how the Second Amendment was intended
to apply to the States through the Fourteenth Amendment. Certainly, the
City of Chicago presented historical arguments that the Second
209.
210.
211.
212.

McDonald v. City of Chicago, 130 S. Ct. 3020, 3062 (2010).
Id. at 3062.
Saenz v. Roe, 526 U.S. 489, 528 (1999) (Thomas, J., dissenting).
McDonald, 130 S. Ct. at 3116-17.

CHARLES_MACROED_FINAL_EDITOR.DOCX

58

2/7/20112:57 PM

AKRON JOURNAL OF CONSTITUTIONAL LAW AND POLICY

Amendment should not be incorporated through the Fourteenth
Amendment’s Privileges or Immunities Clause.213 Their argument was
two-fold. First, the City of Chicago argued that 1868 “public
understanding” does not support incorporation of the entire Bill of
Rights through the Fourteenth Amendment’s Privileges or Immunities
Clause. 214 Second, it was argued that congressional concerns about
discriminatory disarmament is insufficient to show “public
understanding” of the Second Amendment being incorporated.215
Both of these arguments were useful in illustrating that there is
some academic disagreement regarding the meaning of the Privileges or
Immunities Clause. 216 However, what the City of Chicago did not
consider was challenging whether the Fourteenth Amendment’s ratifiers
could constitutionally alter the founding fathers’ interpretation of the
Second Amendment and its intended application to the States.217 Akhil
Amar and many followers have sold legal academia on the notion that
John Bingham and the Reconstruction Congress sought to unequivocally
alter the founders’ view of a national “well-regulated militia” right, 218
and apply a right to bear arms for personal self-defense to the States
through the Fourteenth Amendment’s Privileges or Immunities
Clause. 219 It is asserted that the threat of the Ku Klux Klan, increased
213. The City of Chicago dedicated forty-six pages of their brief to this argument. See Brief of
Respondent City of Chicago and Village of Oak Park, at 54-79, McDonald, 130 S. Ct. 3020 (2010)
(No. 08-1521).
214. Id. at 54-74.
215. Id. at 75-79.
216. For scholarship supporting the City of Chicago’s view, see James E. Bond, The Original
Understanding of the Fourteenth Amendment in Illinois, Ohio, and Pennsylvania, 18 AKRON L.
REV. 435 (1985); Carole Emberton, The Limits of Incorporation: Violence, Gun Rights, and Gun
Regulation in the Reconstruction South, 17 STAN. L. & POL’Y REV. 615 (2006); Lambert Gingras,
Congressional Misunderstandings and the Ratifiers’ Understanding: The Case of the Fourteenth
Amendment, 40 AM. J. LEGAL HIST. 41 (1996); Lawrence Rosenthal, The New Originalism Meets
the Fourteenth Amendment: Original Public Meaning and the Problem of Incorporation, 18 J.
CONTEMP. LEG. ISSUES 361 (2009); George C. Thomas III, Newspapers and the Fourteenth
Amendment: What Did the American Public Know About Section 1?, 18 J. CONTEMP. LEGAL ISSUES
323 (2009).
217. There is sufficient historical evidence supporting that the founding fathers viewed the
Second Amendment as requiring the maintenance of a constitutional “well-regulated militia” or an
individual right to protect the “common defence.” See generally Charles, The Constitutional
Significance of a “Well-Regulated Militia,” supra note 15. See also discussion on James Wilson
supra note 151, at 1141-42.
218. Amar admits that the founding fathers had a “well-regulated militia” right in mind when
drafting the Second Amendment. See AKHIL AMAR, THE BILL OF RIGHTS: CREATION AND
RECONSTRUCTION 50-59 (1998).
219. Amar believes the Reconstruction Congress could alter the Second Amendment as it was
originally understood by the framers to a right of armed, individual self-defense of the home
without altering the text of the Second Amendment itself. Id. at 258-65. There is a multitude of
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Southern violence towards Freedmen, and Black Crow laws concerning
firearms compelled the Reconstruction Congress to ensure the “right to
keep and bear arms” extended to all citizens, white and black. 220
Assuming the historical conclusion that the Fourteenth Amendment
was drafted to apply the Bill of Rights to the States, 221 Amar’s assertion
needs to be qualified using accepted historical methodologies.222 There
is no denying that there were members of the Reconstruction Congress
that viewed the Second Amendment as protecting armed, individual selfdefense of one’s person, property, and family. 223 However, in many
instances that the “right to keep and bear arms” was stated in speeches, it
was only done in passing when listing the Bill of Rights. 224 In these

scholarship supporting that the Reconstruction Congress viewed the Second Amendment as
affirmatively protecting against private violence, but it primarily stems from the work of Stephen P.
Halbrook. See generally STEPHEN P. HALBROOK, FREEDMEN AND THE FOURTEENTH AMENDMENT,
AND THE RIGHT TO BEAR ARMS, 1866-76 (1998) [hereinafter FREEDMEN AND THE FOURTEENTH
AMENDMENT]; STEPHEN P. HALBROOK, THAT EVERY MAN BE ARMED: THE EVOLUTION OF A
CONSTITUTIONAL RIGHT (2d ed. 1994) [hereinafter THAT EVERY MAN BE ARMED]. See also Kopel,
supra note 96. For an “individual right” popular understanding analysis, see Clayton Cramer, et al.,
This Right is Not Allowed by Governments That Are Afraid of the People, 17 GEO. MASON L. REV.
823 (2010).
220. See supra note 219.
221. For some of the prominent scholarship supporting this view, see Richard L. Aynes, Ink
Blot or Not: The Meaning of Privileges and/or Immunities, 11 U. PA. J. CONST. L. 1295 (2009)
[hereinafter Ink Blot or Not]; Richard L. Aynes, Enforcing the Bill of Rights Against the States: The
History and the Future, 18 J. CONTEMP. LEGAL ISSUES 77 (2009) [hereinafter Enforcing the Bill of
Rights Against the States]; Michael Kent Curtis, The Bill of Rights and the States: An Overview
from One Perspective, 18 J. CONTEMP. LEGAL ISSUES 3 (2009) [hereinafter The Bill of Rights and
the States]; Michael Kent Curtis, The 1859 Crisis Over Hinton Helper’s Book, The Impending
Crisis: Free Speech, Slavery, and Some Light on the Meaning of the First Section of the Fourteenth
Amendment, 68 CHI.-KENT L. REV. 1113 (1993 [hereinafter The 1859 Crisis Over Hinton Helper’s
Book]; MICHAEL KENT CURTIS, NO STATE SHALL ABRIDGE: THE FOURTEENTH AMENDMENT AND
THE BILL OF RIGHTS (1990) [hereinafter NO STATE SHALL ABRIDGE].
222. Charles, “Arms for Their Defence”? supra note 15, at 458.
223. According to my research, there are only four instances in the Congressional Globe circa
1866 that definitively speak to members of Congress supporting the stance that the Second
Amendment protects the having and using arms for personal self-defense. See 39 CONG. GLOBE,
FIRST SESSION 1073 (1866) (Mr. Nye stated, “As citizens of the United States [Freedmen] have
equal right to protection, and to keep and bear arms for self-defense.”); id. at 1182 (Mr. Pomeroy
stated Freedmen “should have the right to bear arms for the defense of himself and family and his
homestead.”); id. at 371 (Mr. Davis stated the founding fathers “were for every man bearing his
arms about him and keeping them in his house, his castle, for his own defense.”); id. at 1838.
224. There are numerous instances of this during Reconstruction, but for some examples see id.
at 1629; (Mr. Hart listed “the privileges and immunities of other citizens” as: “‘no law shall be made
prohibiting the free exercise of religion; ‘where ‘the right of the people to keep and bear arms shall
not be infringed; ‘where ‘the right of the people to be secure in their persons, houses . . . ’”); id. at
2765 (Senator Howard stated the “privileges and immunities” include “the freedom of speech and
the press; the right of the people peaceably to assemble and petition the Government for a redress of
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instances, no indication was given as to whether it was in reference to an
individual militia right or a right to repel burglars. There was no
context, thus each member of Congress could have taken their own
interpretation as to what encompassed the “right to bear arms.”
Furthermore, the fact that the Second Amendment was debated
intensively when Congress sought to disarm unlawful Southern militias
supports the historical interpretation that members of Congress had
differing interpretations as to what “right to bear arms” in these general
speeches inferred. 225 Perhaps most importantly, and what this article
sets forth to illuminate, is that there is a significant amount of evidence
to suggest that members of Congress only intended to incorporate the
Second Amendment as to preserve the founders’ intent, i.e., a national
militia where “the people” would equally participate in “bearing arms”
for the defense of the community and nation. Meanwhile any rights
pertaining to the use of “arms” for other purposes would have been
protected by the Fourteenth Amendment’s Equal Protection Clause.
The historical point is that it is inconclusive as to whether the entire
Congress viewed the Second Amendment as applying to the States in the
manner Justice Thomas conveyed. 226 Just as some may have viewed it
as a right to repel private violence, others would have viewed it as purely
a militia right. Again, this article does not seek to challenge that there
were members of Congress and the public circa 1868 who viewed the
Second Amendment as protecting against individual violence.227 What it
does set forth to dispose is that Justice Thomas’ interpretation—of the
Second Amendment applying to the States through the Privileges or
Immunities Clause circa 1868—is not dispositive of the entire Congress
or the people as a whole, for the historical evidence does not provide an
unequivocal answer.
Support for a more limited application of the Second Amendment
to the States is supported by an 1871 speech delivered by John Bingham
at Belpre, Ohio. Bingham detailed how he saw the Fourteenth
Amendment’s Privileges or Immunities Clause applied the Bill of Rights
to the States:
Under the Constitution as it was, no State of this Union ever had the
right to make or enforce any law which abridged the privileges or
immunities of the citizens of the United States, as guaranteed by the
grievances . . . the right to keep and bear arms; the right to be exempted from the quartering of
soldiers . . . ”).
225. Charles, “Arms for Their Defence,”? supra note 15, at 457 n.733.
226. McDonald v. City of Chicago, 130 S. Ct. 3020, 3058-88 (2010).
227. For some scholarship examining this view, see supra note 219.

CHARLES_MACROED_FINAL_EDITOR.DOCX

2010]

2/7/20112:57 PM

THE SECOND AMENDMENT STANDARD OF REVIEW AFTER MCDONALD

61

Constitution of the United States. Yet in nearly half the States of the
Union these privileges and immunities of the citizen were abridged by
the State legislation and State administration. The freedom of speech
was abridged, the freedom of the press was abridged, the freedom of
conscience was abridged, the right of the people to peaceably assemble
was abridged, the equal right of the citizen to vote at all elections was
abridged, and finally, the right to bear arms for the Union and the
Constitution was abridged and prohibited by States laws[.] 228

Of particular interest is how Bingham understood the Second
Amendment as applying to the States. Notice that he makes no mention
of a right to “bear arms” for personal or private interests. Bingham only
makes mention of the fact that state legislatures prevented Freedmen
from “the right to bear arms” in defense of “the Union and the
Constitution[.]” 229 Was this done intentionally? Did Bingham only seek
to apply a militia right to the States via the Second Amendment? The
evidence is debatable. However, if we take Bingham’s 1871 speech
verbatim there is an argument to be made that the Second Amendment
had limited application to the States.
Perhaps what makes Bingham’s speech of great significance, in
support of this argument, is his personal involvement in drafting the
Fourteenth Amendment. In fact, one may argue that Bingham’s
interpretation should be the only interpretation that the courts should
follow in conducting a “popular understanding” analysis.230 This begets
the question: “What was Bingham explicitly referring to, and why did he
not include bearing arms for personal self-defense?”
To begin, it is often forgotten that blacks were excluded from most
state militias and even from the Union Army until the creation of the
infamous 54th Massachusetts Regiment. It did not matter that thousands
of blacks, free and slave, had fought valiantly in the American

228. THE CINCINNATI DAILY GAZETTE (Cincinnati, OH), Sept. 15, 1871, at 2, col. 4.
229. Id.
230. Richard L. Aynes, The Continuing Importance of Congressman John A. Bingham and the
Fourteenth Amendment, 36 AKRON L. REV. 589, 591 (2003) [hereinafter The Continuing Importance
of Congressman John A. Bingham] (“Bingham’s inseparable link with the Amendment makes him
worthy of attention from both a legal and an historical view . . . his words may provide meaning or
context for what has been termed original intent, meaning or understanding of the Fourteenth
Amendment.”); Richard L. Aynes, On Misreading John Bingham and the Fourteenth Amendment,
103 YALE L.J. 57, 103 (1993) [hereinafter On Misreading John Bingham and the Fourteenth
Amendment] (discussing the importance of Bingham’s views on contemporaries and the first federal
courts to apply the Fourteenth Amendment). Justice Thomas’s concurrence also found Bingham’s
view to be “particularly significant as “the principal draftsman of §1[.]” McDonald, 130 S. Ct. at
3072.
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Revolution. 231 This military service had gone forgotten in the pantheons
of history until Civil War abolitionists sought the participation of black
troops. Despite the urging of prominent abolitionists such as Frederick
Douglas, the Lincoln administration refused to enlist blacks because they
“had never shown any ability in the nation’s history.” 232 Thus, to urge
Abraham Lincoln to enlist an all black regiment, a history was compiled
by a librarian and historian named George Moore.233 Entitled Historical
Notes on the Employment of Negroes in the American Revolution, Moore
sought to “set the record straight” by highlighting the valiant service of
the all black First Rhode Island Regiment as well as other instances of
blacks participating in the achievement of American independence.234
By the end of the Civil War, over 200,000 black soldiers had taken
up arms in defense of the Union, mostly slaves from the South. In
reward of their service, Congress offered them the purchase of their
service rifle, believing that many of these men would be called upon
again to secure peace and order in a national or state run militia.
However, Congress did not account for the fact that many Southern
militia laws forbade blacks from serving and disarmed the very veterans
they had provided arms. Congressman Clarke conveyed his displeasure
because “the brave black soldiers of the Union” were “disarmed and
robbed by this wicked and despotic order” when “these brave defenders
of the nation paid for the arms with which they went to battle.”235 On
May 23, 1866, it was reported to Congress:
More than twenty-five thousand colored men of Kentucky have been
soldiers in the Army of the Union . . . in many instances are scourged,
beaten, shot at, and driven from their homes and families. Their arms
are taken from them by the civil authorities and confiscated for the
benefit of the Commonwealth. The Union soldier is fined for bearing

231. For history discussing the contribution of blacks fighting in the American Revolution, see
GARY NASH, THE FORGOTTEN FIFTH: AFRICAN AMERICANS IN THE AGE OF REVOLUTION (2006);
BENJAMIN QUARLES, THE NEGRO IN THE AMERICAN REVOLUTION (1961); PATRICK J. CHARLES,
WASHINGTON’S DECISION: THE STORY OF GEORGE WASHINGTON’S DECISION TO REACCEPT
BLACK ENLISTMENTS IN THE CONTINENTAL ARMY, DECEMBER 31, 1775 (2006); GLEN KNOBLOCK,
“STRONG AND BRAVE FELLOWS”: NEW HAMPSHIRE’S BLACK SOLDIERS AND SAILORS IN THE
AMERICAN REVOLUTION, 1775-84 (2003).
232. PHILIP S. FONER, BLACKS IN THE AMERICAN REVOLUTION 3 (1975).
233. GEORGE MOORE, HISTORICAL NOTES ON EMPLOYMENT OF NEGROES IN THE AMERICAN
REVOLUTION (1862) (New York, Charles T. Evans 1862).
234. FONER, supra note 232, at 4.
235. 39 CONG. GLOBE, FIRST SESSION 1839 (1866).
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arms. Thus the right of the people to keep and bear arms as provided
in the Constitution is infringed. 236

The Committee of Reconstruction similarly reported, “[P]ersons of
color constitute no part of the militia of the State, and no one of them
shall, without permission in writing from the district judge or magistrate,
be allowed to keep a fire-arm . . . pistol, musket or other fire-arms or
weapon appropriate for purposes of war.” 237
Disarming grievances such as these had nothing to do with armed,
individual self-defense, and everything to do with military service, a
national militia, and equality. 238 Could the disarming of these veterans,
i.e., the reserve national militia, been the impetus for applying the “right
to keep and bear arms” to the States? It is plausible, but much is left
unanswered. Again, many Freedmen had valiantly served to restore the
United States, yet, were being deprived the very liberty that they fought
to obtain. 239 What was extremely troubling was that they were being
denied two of the most important political badges of citizenship; the
right to vote and the right to “keep and bear arms.”240 As was portrayed

236. Id. at 2774.
237. Ex. Doc. No. 118, 39 CONG. GLOBE, FIRST SESSION 7 (1866). See also LOWELL DAILY
CITIZEN & NEWS (Lowell, MA), Sept. 13, 1866, pg. 2, col. 1 (“We understand that soldiers who
have served in the Union armies, and when mustered out pain the United States for their guns, have
been deprived of these by ex-rebel soldiers, who do not constitute our police.”).
238. This is not to say that there were not more general disarming grievances that support the
broader individual right view. See Cramer et al., supra note 219, at 855-61.
239. See N.Y. TRIB., May 21, 1866, at 1, col. 6 (“But what would most disturb all our hopes
would be to see those freedmen who had spilled their blood for the defense of the Union rewarded
for their devotion by being deprived of those rights which are, in all republican governments, the
appanage of those brave men who are called to bear arms for their country . . . To give those guilty
of high treason the power to reduce good citizens to the position of political pariahs is to reward
treachery and to discourage patriotism.”); DAILY AUSTIN REPUBLICAN (Austin, TX), Sept. 14, 1868,
at 2, col. 2 (“We tax property as the blacks have—we put a poll tax on every mother’s son of
them—they pay import duties on all they purchase . . . and in the event of invasion or insurrection,
they will be called on to bear arms. Whatever difference of opinion whites may entertain as to their
privileges, there is a surprising unanimity as to their obligations.”). Many in the New York
legislature thought it was justifiable to let the Freedmen to bear arms in defense of the Union, yet
deny them the right to vote; BOSTON DAILY ADVERTISER, Feb. 27, 1866, at 1, col. 4 (“Because
blacks have fought for the country, it is not necessary to give them the right to govern it or
participate in its government. IF it were otherwise every brave boy from 16 to 21 who fought in the
Union ranks should have a vote without waiting for years to participate in the government . . . The
blacks fought for a country, and they have it; they fought for freedom, and they have it . . . [but] the
able-bodied only bear arms, and the able-minded only should vote.”).
240. These two rights were seen as interrelated. See 39 CONG. GLOBE, FIRST SESSION 1183
(1866) (“The ‘right to bear arms’ is not plainer taught or more efficient than the right to carry
ballots.”); LA TRIB. DE LA NEW ORLEANS, Nov. 7, 1865, at 3, col. 2 (“We are forced to pay taxes
without representation—to submit without appeal to laws, however offensive, without a single voice
in framing them—to bear arms without the right to say whether against friend or foe, against loyalty
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in the popular print culture of the era, it was philosophically perplexing
that it was politically acceptable for blacks to serve and die in defense of
the Union, 241 be counted for apportionment, but at the same time be
denied service in state militias.242 Not to mention, it was upsetting that
Freedmen were deprived of the very military “arms” that they had been
given the privilege to purchase from Congress.
Disfavor with the disarming of Freedmen veterans—who
constituted the Union’s national militia—can even be found in the
popular print culture. For instance, in an editorial published in the
Liberator, the Second Amendment was stated verbatim with the
following to support it:

or disloyalty.”); N.Y. TRIB.., Mar. 3, 1866, at 9, col. 3 (“[A] democracy of laws which compels the
able bodied to bear arms and pay taxes, but prohibits the able-minded from having either a vote or
voice in the policies which control them, is a monstrosity in legislation, a falsehood of politics, and
a sandy foundation for a Republic.”); LA TRIB. DE LA NEW ORLEANS, Dec. 21, 1866, at 4, cols. 1-2
(“No one will think of imposing military duties on women and children, compel them to shoulder
the musket, and send them into the line to fight the battles of the country . . . There is a fixed
relation between rights and duties . . . Ability to serve and defend the country, in the fields of labor
and war is, therefore, the basis of electoral immunity.”); N.Y. TRIB., Feb. 24, 1866, at 6, col. 2 (“If
our brave boys of 16 to 21 years had been expected to volunteer and fight for their country—
perhaps die for it—but that they would in no case and never be allowed a voice in its government . .
. If this isn’t base and ungrateful, what would be?”); THE LIBERATOR (Boston, MA), Oct. 6, 1865, at
158, col. 2 (“The moment the Government decided that his aid was necessary to save the
Government, and put arms into his hands, the question was settled, because to bear arms is the
highest position of honor, and if he was good enough to fight in the ranks side by side with our
brave boys in blue, he is good enough to go to the polls.”).
241. Members of Congress were also confused how they could rely on these men to defend the
nation, yet deny them political rights. See 39 CONG. GLOBE, FIRST SESSION 206 (1866) (Mr.
Farnsworth stated, “we compel them to bear arms in support and defense of the Government, and
also to that other important fact, that we tax them for the support of Government . . . [yet] that man
has no right to a voice in the choice of his rulers, and has no lot or part in the Government.”); Id. at
792 (Thomas Williams stated, “He counts in the representation. He pays taxes, and must bear arms
if necessary, and he has done it. No sensible man now pretends to doubt that he is a citizen, or can
doubt it in view of these considerations.”); Id. at 2801 (The Address of the Swiss Conventions read,
“But what would most disturb all our hopes would be to see those freedmen who had spilled their
blood for the defense of the Union . . . [to be] deprived of those rights which are, in all republican
Governments, the appanage of those brave men who are called to bear arms for their country.”).
See also id. at 145, 1183; 38 CONG. GLOBE, FIRST SESSION 1995 (1864); 42 CONG. GLOBE, FIRST
SESSION, at 266 (1871).
242. See THE CINCINNATI DAILY GAZETTE, Jan. 10, 1867, at 1, col. 8 (The Ohio States’ Equal
Rights League proclaimed: “Because we bear arms. We have watered the tree of liberty copiously
with our blood. The battlefields of the American Revolution, those of 1812, and of the late terrible
rebellion, all furnish abundant proofs of the courage and devotion of the colored American, and his
valuable services as a patriot and soldier. If then the State relies on us to defend it with our lives in
war, we solemnly ask in the name of justice for that protection which is only secured by a full and
equal enjoyment of is privileges in time of peace.”).
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When our great war closed, it was deemed advisable that the soldiers
of the Union should be allowed to retain the arms they had so nobly
borne, on condition of payment by each of what was considered by the
Government their cash value. An order was accordingly issued by the
War Department proffering to each honorably discharged soldier the
privilege of purchasing his weapon on payment of that sum. So said,
so done, until now, on the representation of the ex-rebels of Louisiana,
Gen. Canby has nullified Mr. Stanton’s order, directing that the
colored soldiers mustered out of service in his department shall not be
allowed to buy their muskets! 243

Three weeks later the Liberator published another editorial
discussing the unequal treatment Freedmen received. Regarding the
constitutional right to “bear arms,” it read:
“Persons of color constitute no part of the militia of the State!” But
this is an insult to every survivor of Fort Wagner. No one of them,”
says the code, “shall be allowed to keep a fire-arm, sword, or other
military weapon.” And all this in spite of the Declaration of
Independence and the Constitution of the United States, both of which
assert the citizen’s right to bear arms. 244

The Second Amendment was primarily looked to as protecting the
right of Freedmen to “keep and bear arms” for service in the militia for
many reasons. For instance, Judge R.H. Dana, Jr. delivered a speech
proclaiming, “We have a right to demand that [Freedmen] shall bear
arms as soldiers in the militia. Have we not?” 245 Citing the Second
Amendment as authority, Dana’s view was that it was unlawful for states
to exclude Freedmen from the “right to bear arms” because it is not
dependant “upon the decision of any State.” 246 Instead, he rationalized
that because “Congress makes the [national] militia” that it was within
the national interest to “see to it that the emancipated slaves have the
privilege, the dignity and the power of an arms-bearing population.” 247
In an 1866 editorial published in The North American and United
States Gazette, the author applauded the “bold step to make soldiers of
such men in a region where they had been so long held to an inferior
race[.]” 248 “The real importance” of affording Freedmen the privilege to

243. THE LIBERATOR, Nov. 17, 1865, at 183, col. 3.
244. THE LIBERATOR, Dec. 8, 1865, at 193, col. 5.
245. LA TRIBUNE DE LA NEW ORLEANS, July 1, 1865, at 3, col. 2.
246. Id.
247. Id.
248. THE NORTH AMERICAN AND UNITED STATES GAZETTE (Philadelphia, PA), Oct. 23, 1866,
at 2, col. 1.
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serve their country, wrote the author, “is the recognition thus afforded of
the right of the blacks to bear arms, always disputed previously,
notwithstanding the guarantee of the national Constitution.”249
However, these “very men who were deemed fit to be soldiers of the
Union” were now being “disarmed by rebel State officials all over the
south”—which was viewed as an express violation of the Second
Amendment. 250 The editorial elaborated on this point, stating:
Recurring . . . to the language of the Constitution, we find that [the
Second Amendment] couples this great right with the necessity for a
militia, showing obviously enough that the people to be allowed to
keep and bear arms are those of whom a militia can be composed. Of
course, we shall here be answered that the militia is a State institution,
regulated by State laws, and as no blacks are included in it by the laws
of the southern States, none of them are deprived by this article of the
Constitution. Why, then, does the Constitution deem it necessary to
throw this safeguard around it? If the militia be wholly a State
institution, why should the national Constitution look after it thus?
Moreover if the militia belong wholly to the State, where is the
republic to look for soldiers when the State orders the militia to rebel? .
. . [Freedmen] are peculiarly the “people” of the nation, and under the
words of the Constitution are entitled to bear arms. This is clear from
the fact that they have so borne arms as soldiers of the republic . . .
Thus . . . we see but one conclusion—that the negroes of the south
have the constitutional right to keep and bear arms. If they have not,
then they cannot constitutionally be counted at all in apportioning
representatives to the south. 251

Other newspaper reports reveal that Freedmen were fighting for a
militia right to “keep and bear arms” alongside whites. For instance, the
Chicago Tribune reported its disfavor of South Carolina’s Black Codes,
including the law proclaiming “No person of color shall bear arms or
serve in the militia.”252 Similar disfavor was conveyed by the South
Carolina Colored Convention when it proclaimed that such laws are
“forbidden, as a plain violation of the Constitution, and unjust to many
of us in the highest degree, who have been soldiers, and purchased our
muskets from the United States Government when mustered out of the
service.” 253

249.
250.
251.
252.
253.

Id.
Id.
Id.
THE SUN (Baltimore, MD), June 2, 1869, at 3, col. 5.
THE LIBERATOR, Dec. 8, 1765, at 195, col. 4.

CHARLES_MACROED_FINAL_EDITOR.DOCX

2010]

THE SECOND AMENDMENT STANDARD OF REVIEW AFTER MCDONALD

2/7/20112:57 PM

67

Meanwhile, other Freedmen organizations expressed their
appreciation in being granted their Second Amendment right to
participate in state militias. For instance, after the adoption of the 1866
Civil Rights Act, 254 the Tennessee Freedmen’s Convention thanked the
Thirty-Ninth Congress for ensuring that the “inherent privilege as free
citizens to bear arms” was protected. 255 The Convention promised to
exercise their right by enrolling “in the militia of the State ready for the
defense of Tennessee with the same privileges allotted to white
inhabitants.” 256 Naturally, not every state complied with changing their
militia laws to include Freedmen. For this reason the Baltimore
Republican State Convention displayed its disfavor by stating if the
people of Maryland “expect us to bear arms” for the Union, “there is no
reason why we should not be allowed in time of peace to organize
volunteer companies to acquaint ourselves with military service.” 257
To sum up the legal dilemma at hand, there is substantiating
historical evidence to suggest that a majority of the Reconstruction
Congress viewed the Privileges or Immunities Clause as applying a
“well-regulated militia” right to the States. As Judge Dana rationalized
it, given that “Congress makes the militia,” people of all classes,
including “the emancipated slaves[,] have the privilege, the dignity and
the power” to bear arms in federal and state militias. 258 Opponents of
this approach will argue that this evidence does not override the fact that

254. It is often asserted that the 1866 Freedman’s Bureau Act proves that the Reconstruction
Congress wanted to secure a right to possess arms in the home. See Randy E. Barnett, Was the
Right to Keep and Bear Arms Conditioned on Service in an Organized Militia?, 83 TEX. L. REV.
237, 269 (2004) (reviewing H. RICHARD UVILLER & WILLIAM G. MERKEL, THE MILITIA AND THE
RIGHT TO ARMS, HOW THE SECOND AMENDMENT FELL SILENT (2002)). However, there is evidence
suggesting that the drafters may have been primarily concerned with protecting a militia or auxiliary
right. The pertinent Freedman’s Bureau Act section states that citizens shall “have full and equal
benefit of all laws and proceedings concerning personal liberty, personal security, and the
acquisition, enjoyment, and disposition of estate, real and personal, including the constitutional right
to bear arms.” 14 U.S. STAT. 176-77 (1866). Notice how the text “constitutional right to bear arms”
is separated from the text “personal security.” Id. This is significant because Mr. Raymond also
separated the Second Amendment from self-defense when he stated before Congress: “He has a
defined status; he has a country and a home; a right to defend himself and his wife and children; a
right to bear arms; a right to testify in the federal courts; he has all those rights that tend to elevate
him.” 39 CONG. GLOBE, FIRST SESSION 1266 (1866). This separation of text implies that the
drafters were protecting the limited militia or auxiliary right. In many ways, one may read the act as
akin to William Blackstone’s fifth auxiliary right. See 1 WILLIAM BLACKSTONE, COMMENTARIES
ON THE LAWS OF ENGLAND 138-39 (1765); Charles, The Right of Self-Preservation and Resistance,
supra note 15, at 24-60.
255. NEW YORK TRIBUNE, Aug. 11, 1866, at 1, col. 3.
256. Id.
257. THE LIBERATOR, Nov. 17, 1865, at 183, col. 3.
258. Id.
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Fourteenth Amendment ratifiers viewed the Second Amendment as
protecting the right to “keep and bear arms” against private violence as
well. It will be argued that the historical record is full of evidence
suggesting that the ratifiers sought to protect this personal individual
right, as well as the militia right.
This article respectfully disagrees that the Individual Right Scholar
approach reflects the unequivocal view of the entire Congress or the
people as a whole. Certainly, there were members who sought to
incorporate an armed self-defense right. However, there is historical
evidence suggesting many did not intend to override state sovereignty on
the “keeping” of arms outside of a “well-regulated militia.” While this
article does not seek to provide an exhaustive look into this historical
debate, it does seek to illuminate that there is overwhelming evidence to
suggest that the ratifiers of the Fourteenth Amendment would have only
agreed to incorporate the Bill of Rights as the founding fathers
understood it 259 in the spirit of 1776, when the Declaration of
Independence was adopted. 260 In other words, the ratifiers sought to
259. N.Y. TRIBUNE, Feb. 3, 1866, at 12, col. 1 (statement of Sen. Stevens) (“The time has come
when we can make the Constitution what our fathers desired to make it. The time has come when
through blood every stain has been washed out unless we choose to reestablish it.”); 40 CONG.
GLOBE, THIRD SESSION 1004 (1869) (statement Sen. Yates) (“[T]he surest way by which we shall
accomplish our purpose [of restoring the Union] will be to assert that which the Constitution of the
United States meant to assert. It meant to assert the principles in the Declaration of Independence.
The Constitution of the United States was made and framed by the men who framed and made the
Declaration of Independence; and if they did not in the Constitution of the United States carry out
the principles contained in the Declaration of Independence.”); 42 CONG. GLOBE, SECOND SESSION
844 (1872) (statement Sen. Sherman) (“There may be sometimes dispute and doubt as to what is the
right, immunity, or privilege conferred upon a citizen of the United States . . . look first at the
Constitution of the United States as the primary foundation of authority. If that does not define the
right they will look for the unenumerated powers to the Declaration of Independence, to every scrap
of American Independence, to every scrap of American history, to the history of England, to the
common law of England . . . There they will find the fountain and reservoir of the right of American
as well as English citizens.”).
260. 39 CONG. GLOBE, FIRST SESSION 2510 (1866) (statement of Rep. Miller) (“[T]hat no State
shall deprive any person of life, liberty, or property without due process of law, nor deny equal
protection of the laws, [is] so clearly within the spirit of the Declaration of Independence . . . that no
member of this House can seriously object to it.”); id. at 2539 (statement of Rep. Farnsworth) (“I
want some principle embodied in a constitutional amendment that the southern States will accept. I
intend to vote for this amendment . . . for I am not without hope that Congress and the people of the
several States may yet rise above a mean prejudice and do equal and exact justice to all men, put
putting in practice that ‘self-evident truth’ of the Declaration of Independence, that Governments
‘derive their just powers from the consent of the governed,’ . . . So far as [Section 1] is concerned
there is but one clause in it which is not already in the Constitution,’ the Equal Protection Clause);
40 CONG. GLOBE, SECOND SESSION 1967 (1868) (statement of Rep. Stevens) (affirming the purpose
of the Reconstruction Congress is to restore the Constitution to “the principles of government which
were intended by the fathers when in 1776 they laid the foundations of the Government on which
the nation was built.”).
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maintain the States’ traditional sovereign powers concerning the
possession, use, and ownership of arms for private purposes.
Moving forward under this approach, the individual use of arms,
for purposes outside of a militia, would have been protected under the
Equal Protection Clause—an interpretation that is supported by the
speeches of John Bingham. 261 For instance, in a 1867 speech delivered
to ratify the Fourteenth Amendment, Bingham stated the Fourteenth
Amendment “would remain intact the powers of the national and State
governments—the one for general defense and protection, the other for
local administration and personal security[.]” 262 A similar speech was
delivered when Bingham was facing heavy opposition to the inclusion of
the Privileges or Immunities Clause. He calmed states’ rights and “state
sovereignty” advocates by stating that all rights and privileges as the
“result of positive local law,” such as the right to vote, would not be
affected by the Privileges or Immunities Clause. 263 Bingham viewed
local rights and privileges as being protected by the Equal Protection
Clause, for it “established equality before the law, and it gives to the
humblest, the poorest, the most despised of the race the same rights, and
the same protection before the law as it gives to the most powerful, the
most wealthy, or the most haughty.” 264Arguably, the right or privilege to
possess, use, and operate firearms outside of a militia circa 1866 would
fall within a “positive local law” to which Bingham referred.
Bingham 265 was not the only person to assuage states’ sovereignty
advocates in this fashion. James Garfield not only repeated Bingham’s
words verbatim, but stated, “[T]his amendment takes from no State any
right that ever pertained to it.”266 Meanwhile, William Lawrence stated,
“it must be clear that this bill creates no new right, confers no new
privilege, but is declaratory of what is already the constitutional rights of
every citizen in every State, that equality of civil rights is the

261. For an analysis that many members of Congress and legal commentators shared
Bingham’s views on the applicability of the Privileges or Immunities Clause, see Aynes, On
Misreading John Bingham and the Fourteenth Amendment, supra note 230, at 74-94.
262. THE CINCINNATI DAILY GAZETTE, September 2, 1867, at 1, col. 5. See also THE
CINCINNATI DAILY GAZETTE, Aug. 26, 1869, at 1, col. 4 (speech of John Bingham) (“Was it
because the [Fourteenth] amendment took from any State any right reserved to the several States
under the Constitution? If so, what right?”).
263. 39 CONG. GLOBE, FIRST SESSION 2766 (1866).
264. Id.
265. Writing after the adoption of the Fourteenth Amendment, Bingham stated, “God forbid”
that the Fourteenth Amendment “would strike down the rights of the State” because he “believ[ed]
our dual system of government essential to our national existence.” 42 CONG. GLOBE, SPECIAL
SESSION 84 (1871).
266. 39 CONG. GLOBE, FIRST SESSION 2542 (1866).
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fundamental rule that pervades the Constitution and controls all State
authority.” 267
In an 1871 report drafted for the Committee of the Judiciary, John
Bingham would reiterate his stance that the Privileges or Immunities
Clause does not impede on what were always considered to be
traditional matters of state sovereignty. The report stated that the
Fourteenth Amendment “did not change or modify the relations of
citizens of the State and notation as they existed under the original
Constitution.” 268 It is a point of emphasis that Bingham was seeking to
restore the founders’ Constitution. This is confirmed in his speeches.
On August 24, 1869, Bingham stated the purpose of the Fourteenth
Amendment’s Privileges or Immunities Clause was to restore the
“original and declared purpose of the Constitution,” and “lost justice
shall be established in the land[.]” 269 Similarly, in a speech defending
the Fourteenth Amendment against political opponents, Bingham stated:
These gentlemen say they are for the Constitution, the great
Constitution which our fathers gave us. Let them read in the forefront
of that instrument, those words that should be written this day upon the
lintels of ever door in the land: “We the people of the United States, in
order to establish justice, do ordain this Constitution,” etc. I am for the
Constitution, too; and equal political rights amongst all natural born
citizens, in every station of life, is simple justice. Therefore I am for it,
and in standing for it I but imitate the great majority of the people,
who, in 1787, formed the Constitution of the Government, and handed
it down to us as a nation. 270

To be precise, not even the Fourteenth Amendment’s chief architect
viewed Section 1 as impacting federalism any more than the founding
fathers intended. Senator Morrill agreed with this interpretation, stating
that the Fourteenth Amendment did not change “an iota of the
Constitution, as it was originally framed.” 271

267. 42 CONG. GLOBE, SPECIAL SESSION 151 (1871).
267. This fear was repetitively asserted during the 1866 Civil Rights Bill. See 39 CONG.
GLOBE, FIRST SESSION 478, 1121, 1270 (1866). See also 42 CONG. GLOBE, FIRST SESSION 189
(1871) (statement of Rep. Willard) (the Fourteenth Amendment constitutes “the great and solemn
guarantees of liberty and equal rights, the truths of the grand Declaration of Independence made
facts in our history, and made sure by our fundamental law. But we should never forget that, with
the exception of such limitations as have been created by the new amendments, the States exist with
the same exclusive powers, the same sovereignty within their spheres, as before.”).
268. H.R. Rep. No. 41-22, at, 1 (1871).
269. THE CINCINNATI DAILY GAZETTE, Aug. 26, 1869, at 1, col. 3.
270. THE CINCINNATI DAILY GAZETTE, Aug. 26, 1867, at 1, col. 5.
271. 42 CONG. GLOBE, FIRST SESSION 577 (1871).
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Others viewed Section 1 similarly by stressing the significance of
the Equal Protection Clause. As John Farnsworth eloquently stated:
So far as this section [1 of the Fourteenth Amendment] is concerned,
there is but one clause in it which is not already in the Constitution,
and it might as well in my opinion read, “No State shall deny to any
person within its jurisdiction the equal protection of the laws.” 272

Given that many members of Congress did not seek to alter the
traditional spheres of government, this strengthens the claim that the
Equal Protection Clause that was meant to apply to the individual
possession, use, and operation of arms—what many members in the
Reconstruction Congress would have viewed as Article IV Section 2
privileges. In the words of John Bingham, privileges that fell under
“article 4, section 2” were to be enforced equally “as an express
limitation upon the powers of the States.” 273
Naturally, there were varying interpretations as to what the
Privileges or Immunities Clause encompassed. 274 Senator Poland saw it
as “securing nothing beyond what was intended” by Article IV Section
2, ensuring the states equally protected the “doctrine of State rights,” and
that Congress had the power to “enforce this provision throughout the
country and compel its observance.” 275 Meanwhile, Senator Morrill saw
the two clauses as “equivalent at best,” with the Fourteenth
Amendment’s as a means to enforce the Article IV Section 2 clause. 276
However, if the two clauses were distinct as they imply, Morrill thought
the Fourteenth Amendment’s “privileges and immunities” as “not the
full extent of citizenship, or the rights and privileges of citizenship in a
particular State, by any means[.]” 277
In the end, the threshold interpretational question boils down to
this: “Did the ratifiers, as a whole or majority, view personal arms
ownership, use, and operation as purely an issue of State sovereignty or

272. 39 CONG. GLOBE, FIRST SESSION 2539 (1866).
273. H.R. Rep. No. 41-22, at 1 (1871).
274. See 41 CONG. GLOBE, THIRD SESSION 4 (1871); 42 CONG. GLOBE, SPECIAL SESSION 87
(1871) (Congressman Storm interpreted it as follows: “The privileges and immunities of citizens of
the United States had already been secured by article four, section two, clause one of the
Constitution, which provides that ‘the citizens of each State shall be entitled to all the privileges and
immunities of citizens in the several States.’”); 42 CONG. GLOBE, SECOND SESSION 763 (1872) (Mr.
Davis stated: “The fourteenth amendment guarantees to every citizen of the United States who may
change his residence from one State to another all the privileges and immunities which a citizen of
the State, to which he removes may enjoy . . . The prohibition is in very plain language.”).
275. 39 CONG. GLOBE, FIRST SESSION 2961 (1866).
276. 42 CONG. GLOBE, SECOND SESSION 3 (1872).
277. Id. at 4.
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was this too intended to be protected as a privilege of United States
citizenship?” This article does not seek to provide a definitive answer.
However, if one takes Bingham’s 1871 speech verbatim, the Privileges
or Immunities Clause was only intended to apply the Second
Amendment to the States as a means to protect “the right to bear arms
for the Union and the Constitution”278—nothing more, nothing less. All
other privileges or rights to arms for private purposes would have fell in
the category of “positive local law,” 279and would not be affected by the
Privileges or Immunities Clause because it “did not change or modify
the relations of citizens of the State and notation as they existed under
the original Constitution.” 280
Bingham’s words still leave us with one more question: “How did
the ratifiers understand the Second Amendment as binding the States
under the original Constitution?” One way to answer this question is to
look to the constitutional writings of Timothy Farrar, whom interpreted
the Constitution with this question in mind. The work of Farrar is
particularly appropriate because his understanding of the Fourteenth
Amendment has been frequently used to support the argument that the
Privileges or Immunities Clause applies the Bill of Rights to the
States. 281 More importantly, for the McDonald decision, it was one of
the two treatises cited by the plurality as expounding the “fundamental
nature” of possessing a handgun for personal self-defense. 282
A former law partner of Daniel Webster, judge of the New
Hampshire Court of Common Pleas, and president of the New England
Historical and Genealogical Society, Farrar was a well-respected legal
figure in the nineteenth century. 283 The author of Manual of the
Constitution of the United States of America, 284 Farrar’s treatise was
described by Charles Sumner as correcting “false interpretations” of the
The
Constitution and should be “generally accepted now.”285

278. THE CINCINNATI DAILY GAZETTE, Sept. 15, 1871, at 2, col. 4.
279. 39 CONG. GLOBE, FIRST SESSION 2766 (1866).
280. H.R. Rep. No. 41-22, at 1, (1871).
281. See Aynes, Ink Blot or Not, supra note 233, at 1321-22; Curtis, supra note 224, at 1172
n.345; Kopel, supra note 96, at 1470-72; Michael Anthony Lawrence, Second Amendment
Incorporation Through the Fourteenth Amendment Privileges or Immunities and Due Process
Clauses, 72 MO. L. REV. 1, 31 (2007).
282. McDonald v. City of Chicago, 130 S. Ct. 3020, 3042 (2010).
283. Aynes, On Misreading John Bingham and the Fourteenth Amendment, supra note 230, at
84-85.
284. TIMOTHY FARRAR, MANUAL OF THE CONSTITUTION OF THE UNITED STATES OF AMERICA
(1867) (1st ed., Boston, Little, Brown & Co.1867).
285. 9 THE NEW ENGLAND HISTORICAL GENEALOGICAL REGISTER 231 (Henry Fitz-Gilbert
Waters ed., 1875).
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Philadelphia Inquirer reported that Farrar’s treatise was “exceedingly
useful . . . at the present time; one that no student of the Constitution, no
lawyer and, above all no legislator should be without.”286 The Daily
Evening Bulletin described it as “ably written,” “pervaded by a spirit of
candor,” and that there “was never a time when there was more need of
an intelligent study of the great charter of our Republic.” 287 The
Cincinnati Daily Gazette thought it “especially timely,” “a crushing
refutation of State right theories,” and a “well nigh exhaustive treatise on
Constitutional Law.” 288
Farrar’s Manual of the Constitution of the United States of America
is of particular significance in our constitutional jurisprudence because it
was one of the first treatises to analyze the Fourteenth Amendment
contemporaneous with its adoption. It was a work made to be
“accessible and useful to the multitudes[.]” 289 As The American
Presbyterian Review reported, Farrar was “Widely known as a sound
lawyer” and his treatise was intended for “popular use, and not almost
addressed exclusively to the members of” the legal profession.290
Concerning the application of the Fourteenth Amendment’s
Privileges or Immunities Clause to the States, the pertinent sections of
Farrar’s manual read as follows:
In respect to the powers of the government, it is of the same general
character as the last. It re-affirms some pre-existing power, but adds
no new ones . . . No State shall make or enforce any law which shall
abridge the privileges or immunities of the United States . . . This will
scarcely be claimed by anybody to delegate any thing new to the
government, or to prohibit the States from doing any thing which
otherwise they might rightfully do . . . Thus, it will appear, by a minute
analysis of the fourteenth Amendment, that it contains no
augmentation of the powers of the [State or federal] government. 291

286. THE PHILADELPHIA INQUIRER, Sept. 9, 1867, at 2, col. 2.
287. DAILY EVENING BULLETIN, Oct. 19, 1867, at 1, col. 3.
288. THE CINCINNATI DAILY GAZETTE, Oct. 23, 1867, at 1, col. 3.See also NEW HAMPSHIRE
SENTINEL, Apr. 3, 1873, at 1, col. 2 (describing Farrar’s treatise as a “valuable work”). For the most
detailed review, see 26 NEW ENGLANDER 725-40 (New Haven, CT, October 1867). Of course, not
all reviews of Farrar’s treatise were positive. See 9 AMERICAN LITERARY GAZETTE AND
PUBLISHERS’ CIRCULAR 268 (Philadelphia, PA, Sept. 16, 1867) (describing Farrar’s treatise as “the
anti-state-right doctrine”); 87 CHRISTIAN EXAMINER 99-104 (New York, NY, July 1869)
(recommending John Pomeroy’s An Introduction to Constitutional Law in the United States over
Farrar’s treatise).
289. 2 THE AMERICAN PRESBYTERIAN REVIEW 459, 467 (Philadelphia, PA, July 1870).
290. Id.
291. FARRAR, supra note 284, at 401-02, 408.
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Regarding the application of the Second Amendment to the States,
in light of the Fourteenth Amendment, Farrar’s treatise does not give a
detailed analysis. In multiple instances he lays the claim that the Second
Amendment is a right of the people, which binds the States as well as the
federal government. 292 However, Farrar gives no indication that the
Second Amendment binds the States as to prevent state and municipal
governments from regulating the possession, use, and operation of arms
for private purposes. 293 It can be assumed that Farrar did not see the
Fourteenth Amendment as prohibiting “the States from doing any thing
which otherwise they might rightfully do,” 294 such as regulating the
private possession, use, and operation of arms, but the Manual of the
Constitution of the United States of America leaves much unanswered.
Perhaps the answer lies with the fact that Farrar’s interpretation of
the Constitution was in line with John Bingham. Like Bingham, Farrar
had always viewed the Bill of Rights as applying to the States. 295 In an
1862 article entitled States Rights, Farrar disagreed with the holding in
Barron v. Baltimore, writing:
The first ten amendments are in the nature of a “Bill of Rights,” and it
is a matter of history that they were proposed by some of the State
Conventions, recommended by the first Congress, and adopted by the
Nation . . . They enunciate certain abstract principles, and recognize
certain personal rights, as inherent in every man under the protection
of the Government. The first only is an express negation of power in
Congress. The other no more deny the power of Congress than of
everybody else. They deny the power of everybody, only by
implication, because the existence of the power would be inconsistent
with the security of the recognized right. They prescribe no duty.
This, also is left to implication. Is the duty wholly upon the General
Government of the United States? And is it well performed when they
abstain from violating the right themselves, though they allow it to be
violated by every municipal corporation in the land? The people of the
United States claim these rights, and inserted their recognition of them

292. Id. at 59, 145, 295, 396, 513.
293. Farrar’s second and third editions did not add or take away from his analysis of the
Second Amendment. See TIMOTHY FARRAR, MANUAL OF THE CONSTITUTION OF THE UNITED
STATES OF AMERICA 59, 145, 286, 396, 513, 561 (2d ed., Boston, Little, Brown & Co. 1869);
TIMOTHY FARRAR, MANUAL OF THE CONSTITUTION OF THE UNITED STATES OF AMERICA 59, 145,
286, 396, 513, 563 (3d ed., Boston, Little, Brown & Co. 1872).
294. FARRAR, supra note 284, at 402.
295. See Timothy Farrar, State Rights, 21 NEW ENGLANDER 695 (Oct. 1862). Naturally, Farrar
was not the first constitutional commentator to apply the Bill of Rights to the States. See RAWLE,
supra note 134, at 114-37.
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in their fundamental law, for the purpose of holding their own
Government responsible for the protection and enjoyment of them. 296

It is here that Farrar provides his most detailed analysis of the
Second Amendment, and its application to the States. What stood out to
Farrar in particular was the Second Amendment’s use of “shall not be
infringed.” He queried, “May it still be infringed by everybody except
Congress, and Congress not bound to protect it?” 297 But what Second
Amendment right was Farrar referring to? Was it a right to personal
self-defense or was it a right to participate in a “well-regulated militia”
in defense of the Union?
Purely taking into account Farrar’s Manual of the Constitution of
the United States of America, one could argue either way. One argument
would claim that Farrar makes no mention of a “well-regulated militia,”
and describes the “right to keep and bear arms” as an individual right. 298
Thus, the only logical conclusion is that Farrar believed the Second
Amendment was applicable to the States as ensuring individuals have a
right to “keep and bear arms” against private violence. The counterargument to this would read that Farrar lists “the right to keep and bear
arms” as being protected under the “general powers of the government
to provide for the common defence,” 299 thus Farrar clearly understood
the Second Amendment as applicable to the States in a purely “wellregulated militia” context.
The tipping point may rest with Farrar’s 1862 article entitled State
Rights, for he observed the Second Amendment as being applicable “to
the states by [its] terms.” 300 To be precise, Farrar viewed the Second
Amendment’s use of “free State” as the implication that bound the “right
to keep and bear arms” to the States. He wrote “If a well regulated
militia is necessary to a free state, it is certainly as necessary that the
right to bear arms should not be infringed by the state itself, as by any
body else.” 301 From this statement it can be ascertained that Farrar
viewed the Second Amendment in its “well-regulated militia” context
rather than just as a “right to keep and bear arms” for any and all
purposes as others have asserted. 302

296. Farrar, supra note 293, at 711.
297. Id. at 712.
298. FARRAR, supra note 284, at 59, 145, 295, 396, 513.
299. Id. at 286.
300. Farrar, State Rights, supra note 293, at 712.
301. Id.
302. See Kopel, supra note 96, at 1471 (“Farrar believed that the Bill of Rights, including the
enumerated right of a person to keep and bear arms, was enforceable against the states even without
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Again, this article does not seek to answer the historical question as
to whether the Reconstruction Congress agreed with John Bingham’s
1871 speech and Timothy Farrar as to the application of the Second
Amendment to the States. Many historical questions regarding “public
understanding” remain unanswered. However, what this article does set
forth to illuminate is Justice Stevens’ point that accepted historical
methodologies can only take us so far in understanding what the
Fourteenth Amendment ratifiers, as a whole, intended. Whether this
historical analysis would have shifted the outcome of McDonald is
unclear. However, if one views the primary legal issue in McDonald as
the right to “keep arms,” this historical evidence may have caused the
Justices to rethink their judicial approach. Naturally, the legal
community can only speculate.
IV. CONCLUSION
There are two important historical aspects that legal commentators,
scholars, and historians can take from McDonald v. City of Chicago.
The first is that the “historical guidepost” standard of review is the
proper means to determine the constitutionality of gun regulations. A
“historical guidepost” is either a longstanding historical restriction on
the “keeping” or “bearing” of arms circa 1791 or a longstanding
ideology for regulating or restricting the “keeping” or “bearing” of arms
circa 1791. The “historical guidepost” standard of review requires
courts to give federal and State governments deference to adopt gun
restrictions that fall within traditional and historical areas of regulation
as would have been publicly accepted by the founding fathers. This
includes restrictions designed to protect the public against injury, and
regulations on aliens, hunting, felons and the mentally ill, the carrying of
arms in public, concealed weapons, limiting the types of arms
individuals may possess, the transportation of arms, and the discharging
of arms in public.
With the exception of regulations designed to prevent “public
injury,” regulations that fall within these traditional restraints should be
viewed under a rationale basis standard of review. To put it another
way, traditional regulations circa 1791 should be analyzed under the
lowest standard of scrutiny unless the challenging party can show that
the founding fathers would have thought such regulations were not

the Fourteenth Amendment . . . the right to arms was treated as one of the important individual
rights guaranteed by the Constitution.”).
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constitutionally permissible. It is when the challenging party succeeds
that the courts should move to step two.
It must be emphasized that the “historical guidepost” standard of
review does not require directly linking the law in question to a 1791
restriction in order to qualify as “publicly accepted.” The question that
the courts have to ask is whether the founder’s understanding of the right
to arms would have accepted it, for the historical method does not have
to be the “perfect means . . . but whether it is the best means available in
an imperfect world.” 303 In other words, the historical issue is whether
under “any historical methodology, under any plausible standard of
proof, would lead to the same conclusion.” 304
The second important historical aspect that commentators, scholars,
and historians can take from McDonald is that the history of the “right to
keep and bear arms” was not as comprehensively litigated as many
thought. The State Second Amendment analogues circa 1789,305
1803, 306 1820, 307 and 1868 308 all reveal the right to “keep arms” was not
as prominent in the States as the Heller majority and McDonald plurality
has led the legal community to believe. Furthermore, assuming the
Privileges or Immunities Clause applied the Bill of Rights to the States,
the historical record is unclear as to which interpretation of the Second
Amendment its ratifiers as a whole were seeking to apply. Was it an
amendment intended to protect the right to bear arms for “public
defence,” “private defence,” or both?
In 1874, The Central Law Journal published a series of articles set
out to answer this question in the constraints of judicial review. Entitled
The Right to Keep and Bear Arms for Private and Public Defence, 309
the articles comprise the first law review article on the Second
Amendment. Written anonymously, it sought to answer whether the
Second Amendment bound the States as well as the federal government.
In particular, the article examined the varying court opinions as to what
rights the Second Amendment and corresponding State analogues
afforded. The conclusion that The Right to Keep and Bear Arms for

303. McDonald v. City of Chicago, 130 S. Ct. 3020, 3058 (2010) (emphasis in original).
304. Id. at 3058.
305. See supra Part III.A.
306. See supra Part III.A.; see supra Chart I.
307. See supra note 190.
308. See supra Part III.A.; see supra Chart II.
309. See The Right to Keep and Bear Arms for Private and Public Defence, 1CENT. L. J. 259
(May 28, 1874); The Right to Keep and Bear Arms for Private and Public Defence, 1 CENT. L. J.
273 (June 4, 1874); The Right to Keep and Bear Arms for Private and Public Defence, 1 CENT. L. J.
295 (June 18, 1874).
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Private and Public Defence reached was the opposite of the McDonald
plurality:
[T]here would seem to remain no doubt that if the question [of the
Second Amendment applying to the States] should ever arise in [the
Supreme Court] it would be held that the second amendment of the
federal constitution is restrictive upon the general government merely,
and not upon the states, and that every state has the power to regulate
the bearing of arms in such manner as it sees fit, or to restrain it
altogether. 310

In coming to this determination, the authors were following
Supreme Court precedent circa 1874, holding that the Bill of Rights did
not apply to the States. 311 However, what is significant is that the
authors disagreed with this precedent in the constraints of the Second
Amendment. Much like the way Timothy Farrar viewed the use of “free
State” as the implication that bound the Second Amendment to the
States in its “well-regulated militia” context, 312 the anonymous authors
of The Right to Keep and Bear Arms for Private and Public Defence
took a similar stance:
So in the Arkansas case, The State v. Buzzard, 4 Ark. 18, 313 all the
judges appear to have understood this amendment as applicable to the
states; and Judge Dickinson supposes it to pertain to the power
possessed by the general government of organizing, arming, and
disciplining the militia. He says this provision of the federal
constitution “is but an assertion of that general right of sovereignty
belonging to independent nations, to regulate their military force.”
This view of Judge Dickinson contains the only plausible reason we
have met with for supposing that this amendment is binding on the
states. 314

This begets the question: “Why is this first law review on the
Second Amendment significant?” The answer is that what constitutes
“public understanding” of the Second Amendment circa 1868 is not as

310. The Right to Keep and Bear Arms, supra note 309, at 296.
311. Id. at 295 (citing Barron v. City of Baltimore, 32 U.S. 243 (1833); Fox v. Ohio, 46 U.S.
410 (1847); Smith v. Maryland, 59 U.S. 71 (1855); Twitchell v. Commonwealth, 74 U.S. 321
(1869)).
312. Farrar, supra note 293, at 711.
313. State v. Buzzard, 4 Ark. 18 (Ark. 1842). See also English v. State, 35 Tex. 473, 475 (18)
(“[T]his one seems to be of a nature to bind both the State and National legislatures . . . the right to
‘bear’ arms refers merely to the military way of using them, not to their use in bravado and
affray.”).
314. The Right to Keep and Bear Arms, supra note 309, at 295 (emphasis added).
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clear and convincing as the Heller majority and McDonald plurality
would have it. The fact that some members of Congress viewed the
Second Amendment as securing a right against private violence does not
dictate how Congress or “public understanding” as a whole understood
it. The Amendment’s mention of a “well-regulated militia” and a “free
State” was often construed as protecting purely a militia right as the
1874 anonymous law review makes clear.
Of course, the matter of Second Amendment incorporation has
been settled in McDonald, thus leaving what truly constituted 1868
“public understanding” of the Second Amendment moot to much of the
legal community. This fact, however, should not disparage historians
and legal scholars from definitively finding the consensus of the “right
to keep and bear arms” among the Fourteenth Amendment’s ratifiers.
While historians like Michael Kent Curtis and Robert J. Cottrol, legal
scholars such as Richard L. Aynes and Bryan Wildenthal, and Individual
Right Scholars such as Don B. Kates and Stephen P. Halbrook have
provided much to this debate, there are still many questions left
unanswered to fully appreciate what was the “public understanding” of
the right circa 1868.

